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Abstract 
 
Much academic research has analyzed the issue of Islamophobia and how Muslims are often 
represented in a negative or stereotypical way in Western countries. There is little research 
focusing on this phenomenon in East Asia, and specifically, in South Korea. This thesis 
attempts to fill this gap by shedding light on this particular topic in South Korea, in 
explaining why Islamophobic attitudes were particularly pervasive among certain sectors 
including right wing politicians and Protestants in the country between 2014 and 2016. 
Despite the visible presence of a Muslim minority since the 1990s in South Korea a decade 
before 9/11, the debate that Muslims could be a potential security or cultural threat and thus 
should be assimilated into the relatively homogenous Korean society has prevailed. This case 
study is important because Islamophobic sentiments, such as negative perceptions and 
prejudices against Islam and Muslims, have recently spread in the South Korean society 
affecting the Muslim minority in the aftermath of 9/11, and following an incident where 
Korean citizens were kidnapped by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2007. This phenomenon has 
been further fueled by a series of interconnected terror attacks throughout the world mainly 
conducted or inspired by ISIS since 2014. The research for this thesis is based on an in-depth 
discourse analysis of the roots of Islamophobic discourse in South Korea with special 
reference to securitization theory, which posits that the analysis of issues through the frame 
of security contributes to the creation of hostile public discourse and places national interests 
above other issues like tolerance and acceptance. It also investigates how security and 
political discourses regarding Muslims have been formulated, followed by an analysis of the 
social discourse, media coverage, and online discourse. This thesis deals with online 
discourse by exploring the nature of Islamophobic attitudes via a case study on Twitter and 
the religious discourse by looking in detail at Christian-Muslim relations.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Unlike many Western countries, South Korea has not had a significant history of 
cultural polarization and discrimination (Baker, 2006). It has generally been described in 
academia as a mono-ethnic society which has seen almost zero immigration throughout its 
long history (S. Kim, 2010). However, both rapid economic growth and the impact of 
globalization have moderately-transformed South Korea from a mono-ethnic to a diverse 
ethnic labor market during the second half of the 20
th
 century (Kang, 2010). The continuing 
influx of Muslim migrant workers into South Korea, who are currently estimated around 
135,000, resulted significantly from a huge demand for blue collar labor in industries such as 
manufacturing, and the repercussions of interactions with other countries mainly from Asian 
countries with large Muslim populations. A steady flow of Muslim migrants arriving in South 
Korea mostly from Indonesia (24,789), Uzbekistan (23,865), Bangladeshi (8,076), and 
Pakistan (3,825), has contributed to this growth (S. Her, 2015). Current estimates for the total 
number of Muslims in South Korea are around 145,000, who are working mainly in 
manufacturing industries (Ahn, 2015 & Baker, 2006). Muslim groups from foreign countries 
are generally divided into three blocks: those that are mainly Muslim migrants (135,535) 
from predominantly Islamic countries, marriage-migrant Muslims (5,553), and converted 
Muslims who are mostly married to foreign Muslim migrants (2,703) in the country (Ahn, 
2015). There are 1.42 million foreign residents among the total population of 50 million in 
South Korea (Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
The emergence of a heightened awareness about foreigners has slowly followed this 
observed migration pattern: Hate speech directed toward Muslim migrants and multicultural 
people and families, has spread pervasively in South Korea (S. Lee, 2015). Especially in the 
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aftermath of 9/11, and following an incident where Korean citizens were kidnapped by the 
Taliban in Afghanistan in 2007, Islamophobic sentiments have affected the Muslim minority 
(S. Her, 2015). This phenomenon has been further fueled by a series of interconnected terror 
attacks mainly conducted or inspired by ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Shams) throughout 
the world. According to analysis by South Korean researcher Koo, Gi Yeon (2016), negative 
search terms related to Islam and Muslims increased in earnest on social media since ISIS 
officially declared Caliphate State in Mosul, Iraq in 2014. 
Despite the rise in anti-Muslim attitudes in the country, the South Korean 
government and politicians have failed to establish relevant laws investigating, prohibiting or 
punishing hate speech and hate crimes against Muslims. In South Korea, there is no relevant 
law similar to the hate crime statute laws of the United States, and consequently it is difficult 
to determine the nature of Islamophobia in South Korea (M. Yang & H. Lee, 2008). There are 
even no official statistics on hate speech or hate crimes against Muslims because there is no 
legal definition of hate crimes in South Korea. Moreover, the South Korean government 
conceived the introduction of an official labor migration system in order to systemically 
control and manage foreign workers (Kim, 2010 & Her, 2015). This system has the potential 
to impact the acceptance of the majority groups towards the minority groups including 
Muslims, as the system would label foreign migrants as temporary sojourners, partly 
excluding them from the South Korean society many of them have lived in for several years 
(S. Her, 2015). Under these circumstances, many Muslim migrant workers encounter various 
challenges during the adaptation process, such as discrimination and Islamophobic sentiment 
(S. Her, 2015). Recently, South Korea has experienced increasing public debate about foreign 
migrants, minorities and related government policies (J. Yi, 2015).  
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a wider understanding of the challenges 
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the growing Muslim minority has recently faced in South Korea. This study focuses on 
exploring the roots of Islamophobic discourse in South Korea by securitization frame and the 
deep-rooted images of Islam and Muslims in the country. Analyzing these images is critical 
as they lay the groundwork for the Islamophobic discourse in South Korea. This investigation 
also allows for an interesting study of security complexities, multiculturalism, and the media 
framing concerning Muslims, which will help shed light on how security discourse functions 
within different contexts. In addition, this study examines how anti-Muslim groups such as 
right wing politicians including former President Park Geun-Hye, who led the ruling Saenuri 
party, as well as conservative Protestants living mainly in Seoul, play on the anxieties created 
by the potential threat in order to stir up anti-multiculturalism and Islamophobic sentiments. 
This is done by analyzing common rhetoric towards Muslims used by these actors. Some of 
them, for example, propose a nationalistic ideology that tends to exclude other ethnics 
including Muslims. For them, national security requires a protection of the relatively mono-
ethnic country against foreign influences, particularly from the Islamic world. 
Furthermore, this thesis investigates how these same groups have instrumentalized the 
increasing global threat of ISIS to incite prejudice against Muslims, through security 
discourse, social pressures, religious discourse, and media framing. Following this discussion 
on the role of security discourse, this thesis will explore how social media outlets such as 
Twitter have become a powerful platform for these groups to spread anti-Muslim sentiments.  
According to a survey, around 5 million South Koreans were using Twitter in 2011. Also, 
Twitter is an important media platform because it allows people to stay up-to-date with the 
news and access and connect through the exchange of quick and frequent messages.  
In this way, this study contributes to an understanding on the roots of Islamophobic 
discourse in South Korea and the motivation of those who perceive Muslim communities as 
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problematic and a major security concern. 
 
Research Question and Argument 
The main question of this thesis is to contextualize the Muslim experience in South 
Korea in order to discern the roots of Islamophobic discourse and inter religious intolerance 
towards the Muslim community in the country. The study of pervasive and deep-rooted 
images on Islam and Muslims is also important because these images have played a role in 
laying the groundwork for fueling Islamophobic sentiments in the country. In this sense, the 
main aim of this thesis is to determine whether there is Islamophobia against a migrant 
Muslim community in South Korea. 
There has been little research on Islam through the lens of security and political 
discourse in South Korea compared to the West. This may be because these East Asian 
countries including South Korea, China, and Japan have not faced serious problems and 
challenges regarding Islam and do not have a large Muslim community like many Western 
countries. Thus, the lack of research about Islam and Muslims in South Korea leaves very 
little information for understanding the rise of Islamophobia in the region. 
The research question is addressed through securitization theory by analyzing the 
political, social, religious and media discourse, as well as online framing of the migrant 
Muslim minority in South Korea, exploring certain sectors of South Korean society have 
exacerbated the existential threat of ISIS as an instrument of attack against this minority. This 
theory may help provide us with lens for analyzing the relations between the South Korean 
society and the Muslim community in the country. One of the most interesting characteristics 
of securitization theory is its emphasis on the construction and confrontation of security 
threats (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In addition, this thesis examines how social media users, in 
particular Twitter users, play on the anxieties created by the potential threat.  
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Research Methods 
 This section discusses the use of the qualitative research methods and underlying 
assumptions regarding the reasons for Islamophobia in South Korea. This thesis aims to 
explore the dynamics of threat construction as relates to the framing of Islam and Muslims as 
an issue of security by means of a comprehensive and broad discourse analysis. The 
discourse analysis reveals that one of the most interesting features in the South Korean case is 
the construction of security threat. This research is concerned with discursive security 
discourse in the context of history of Islamophobia and the process of establishing the public 
agenda based on securitization as a theoretical foundation. The main method used is 
qualitative discourse analysis. It utilizes content analysis in specific occasions and incidents 
that call for complementary research. Qualitative research methods provide the researcher 
with a deeper understanding of complex issues, as every individual experiences phenomena 
differently in a given context where multiple realities coexist (Creswell, 2007). These 
multiple realities are constructed through individuals’ social interaction with others (Ibid). In 
order to achieve the main goal of understanding the reasons for the roots of Islamophobia in 
multiple South Korean realities, qualitative research is a more suitable approach for this study 
than a quantitative research. 
Furthermore, this research attempts to understand the four main factors that 
contribute to the spread of Islamophobic sentiments in South Korea. It will take a multi-
method approach which incorporates primary and secondary research on Islam, Muslims and 
Islamophobia in South Korea because these are likely to be interlinked. Discourse analysis 
will provide an understanding and a background on many of the contemporary issues like 
Islamophobic discourse in South Korea. As stated above, the goal of securitization studies is 
to understand who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results, and under 
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what conditions (Buzan, Waeve, & de Wilde, 1998). All these questions are addressed by 
each chapter of this thesis in five stages. 
The first section will investigate that political discourse may play a key role in 
spreading Islamophobic attitudes in South Korea. This discourse serves to confirm whether 
Islam and Muslims are portrayed as a security matter. Islam has been framed through a 
security lens as a result of political discourse. This discourse, which is perhaps the most 
important factor of this thesis, securitizes the salience of conflict related to Islam by 
portraying Muslims as a security issue and, this is evident in policy speeches of securitizing 
agents who bundle Islam and Muslims with referent objects such as terror attacks and 
government policies regarding foreign migrants. The securitization of Islam in the South 
Korean case will be addressed by analyzing the history of security in South Korea, the open 
speeches of politicians, and the government’s policies towards migrants including Muslims in 
the country. 
Second, it is significant to investigate how South Korean society has responded to 
minority groups and the Multiculturalism trend in order to understand the background of 
Islamophobic discourse. In South Korea, social-approaches that integrate minority groups 
have been neglected for decades. In particular, this section will explore how anti-Muslim 
groups have behaved in the relatively mono-ethnic society by analyzing the responses of 
conservative politicians and Protestant groups through existing research and news coverage.  
The focus of the third section is placed on understanding how some South Korean 
churches may have spread anti-Islam slogans and other hate speech towards Muslims. This 
prominent sector of South Korean society often uses the “us verse them” frame in response to 
the influx of Muslims into South Korea, reminding church attendees of the gradual 
Islamization happening in the country (J. Lee, 2011). This section also will analyze the 
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characteristics of South Korean Christianity, specifically Protestants, relying on existing 
research and news coverage regarding religious conflict between Christianity and Islam in the 
country. 
The fourth section will investigate how South Korean media has described Islam and 
Muslims. South Korean media has a tendency to report on negative incidents related to Islam 
and the Middle East without significant challenge to it. This section demonstrates 
stereotypical Islam and Muslim images through analyzing the studies of news coverage on 
the Middle Eastern Issues. In this sense, the media discourse in South Korea will provide us 
insights regarding the way the topics of Islam and Muslims have been dealt with in the 
country.  
The last section will investigate how online media plays a role in spreading and 
rooting images about Muslims by associating words such as terror, ISIS, war, and conflicts 
with Islam. This section will highlight how online media depicts Islam and Muslims in South 
Korea through existing research focusing on social media based on statistical analysis. In 
particular, analyzing Twitter cases will provide an insight on the way in which social media 
has contributed to the spread of Islamophobic images on internet.  
 The primary research will be supplemented by a statistical analysis of Twitter as a 
parameter to show how the South Korean society responded to the Muslim community after 
specifically significant events. In the fifth stage, the case study of social media focuses on 
Korean language Twitter. It is rational to choose Twitter as an indicator of Islamophobia 
because it is an important and high ranking social media platform in South Korea.  
There may be drawbacks to using and analyzing data via social media sites such as 
Twitter. For example, there are issues related to anonymity and public and private posts 
resulting in a decrease in the reliability of information. Nonetheless, the case study is still 
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useful because it provides specific insight into emerging patterns of online Islamophobia 
appearing on Twitter. Moreover, although its findings cannot be generalized to all South 
Koreans regarding online Islamophobia, this research will give us a better understanding of 
how social media sites have been used to generate online feelings of Islamophobia. Therefore, 
it is meaningful to investigate the role of social media in spreading ideas about Islam and 
Muslims in South Korea since it plays a key role in framing anti-Muslim sentiments. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Framework of Securitization and Threat 
This thesis attempts to raise awareness about Islamophobia, commonly defined as the 
fear or hatred of Muslims and Islam, by using securitization theory proposed by Oren Weaver 
(1998) in order to study the South Korean case. Security is a very important concept related 
to Islamophobia because the perception of security plays a role in framing Islam and Muslims 
as a threat. Islam and Muslims have clearly been framed as a security threat in the last decade 
(Bonansinga, 2016). For this reason, security can contribute to the spread of negative 
perception that turns a phenomenon into a collective risk for societies and states (Bonansinga, 
2016). The transformation from a social matter to a political and security matter then occurs. 
The significant observation of Islamophobic sentiments coincided with the security 
concerns given to Islam. According to securitization theory, a phenomenon is a threat to 
security when it is framed by labeling something a security issue and subsequently it is 
becoming one (Weaver, 2004). This means that when securitizing actors adopt the rhetoric of 
security to convince the audience of the existential nature of the threat, it can be defined as a 
securitizing move (Bonansinga, 2016). To present an issue as an existential threat is to say 
that: “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant” (Buzan et al., 1998). 
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Therefore, securitization theory can be used to understand the function and effect of political, 
social, and religious discourse, and the media’s narratives, as it analyzes key-actors and how 
they articulate security threats to the public. This theory also represents the lens through 
which the vast majority of public opinion sees an issue of public concern (Buzan et al., 1998). 
For this reason, Bonansinga (2016) states that, “the securitization of an issue is strictly related 
to the political agenda. Once an issue has gained the status of security threat, it automatically 
enters the policy agenda.” (p.3) 
The securitization exercise constitutes three main factors: the securitizing agent, the 
referent object, and the audience (Barrios, 2013). This research attempts to use these three 
elements based on securitization theory as they relate to Islamophobic discourse in South 
Korea. For instance, the securitizing agent performs the speech and action such as anti-
Muslim campaigns by framing a specific issue like ISIS as a threat to the referent object. 
Consequently, the audience decides whether they accept the securitization frame or not, by 
tolerating the breaking of rules or procedures that otherwise would have to be obeyed 
(Barrios, 2013). 
As mentioned earlier, the main aims of the securitization theoretical approach are to 
elucidate “who securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results, and under what 
condition” (Buzan & Waever, 1998). One of the objectives of this thesis is to apply the 
framework developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in order to demonstrate the 
characteristics of the securitization of Islamophobia in South Korea while investigating main 
possible factors that have caused the phenomenon. This research also focuses on the way in 
which securitizing agents have securitized Islamophobic discourse by using their rhetorical 
strategy like raising concerns about terrorism. This strategy is usually based on two steps: 
firstly, through a process of hyper simplification, Muslims are depicted as a homogenous 
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entity; secondly, rigid and impermeable boundaries are constructed between the majority and 
minority groups (Bonansinga, 2016). Furthermore, this thesis refers to the analysis of the 
security discourse, structure of hate speech and actions, and its components as enacted by the 
Korean conservative politicians, the government, media, and Christian churches. 
Securitization is generally a process by which an issue is presented as an existential 
threat that calls for the placement of the issue in a condition of emergency, and justifies the 
adoption of special measures to handle it (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In international relations, 
securitization is the process of state actors transforming subjects into a matter of security; an 
extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of 
security (Weaver, 1998).  
This theoretical framework helps to provide a better understating of Islamophobia in 
South Korea by using the lens of securitization to analyze this phenomenon. By applying this 
process to South Korea, this thesis reveals how the securitizing agents such as right wing 
politicians and religious groups create and fuel negative perceptions about Muslims and use 
media in order to receive support in South Korea. The construction of this perception is based 
mainly on hinting that Muslims could be potential terrorists and thus be security concern, 
presenting the potential Islamization of the society as a cultural threat, and increasing 
pointing illegal migrant workers as economic threats.  
 This thesis began as an interest in studying Islamophobia within the frame of security 
in South Korea, conceiving this issue as a security concern. Although anti-Muslim sentiments 
are not new in South Korea, it is meaningful to explore how the security discourse is 
constructed and the types of frames that conservative ruling and religious groups use to 
construct them. This thesis argues that these groups successfully securitize anti-Muslim 
sentiments by using a rhetoric that emphasize the security concerns and the use of security 
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discourse.  
In order to analyze Islamophobic discourse in South Korea, this thesis uses existing 
literature regarding the historical background of Muslims and the development of 
Islamophobic discourse in South Korean society. The results of this case study will reveal 
four main factors that appear to significantly contribute to increasing anti-Muslim sentiments 
in South Korea: heavily securitized frame, social pressure on Muslims, the role of Protestants, 
and the deep-rooted negative images associated with Islam and Muslims in mass media and 
social media. 
The first main factor will highlight political and policy discourse about Islam and 
Muslims. This discourse focuses on how security framing may profoundly influence in 
forming the misperceptions and negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the South Korean 
case, after the emergence of Islamic militants such as ISIS and its terror attacks in Europe, 
some right-wing ruling parties have attempted to obtain the attention of the public by 
inflating threats and exploiting people’s irrational fears about Muslims (S. Han, 2016). Like 
this phenomenon, South Korean right-wing ruling party attempted to raise security concerns 
by using ISIS issues and political discourse. These movements have thrived gradually 
because security issues have been the main agenda used for its propaganda and gaining 
support during the times of uncertainty due to the securitization process. Moreover, the policy 
of the South Korean government towards Muslim migrants may have played a role in 
contributing to weaken the foothold of Islam and Muslim minority in the country. Certain 
policies of the government have not made it easier for foreigners to integrate into the society. 
Under these circumstances, examining the discourse between politicians, decision makers, 
and conservative ruling groups is very important when it comes to addressing the security 
matters being used to fuel Islamophobia. In this sense, the first factor that may contribute to 
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Islamophobic sentiments will be analyzed by looking at the assessments or public speeches of 
right wing politicians, intelligence authority, and political activities of conservative civil 
groups. 
The second factor that will be analyzed is social discourse, based on the debate 
surrounding the mono-ethnic ideology, the Muslim migrant community, and the lack of legal 
protection in tackling anti-Muslim sentiments. The social pressures may increase inter 
religious intolerance in South Korea. Current high unemployment among young people 
coupled with low economic growth can be seen as adding to the spread of intolerance 
regarding policies of multi-culturalism, which directly affects Muslims living in South Korea. 
This maybe because young Korean people tend to believe that multi-culturalism might 
strengthen their unemployment, consequently, it leads them to be less tolerant to certain 
migrant issues due to the dissatisfaction. In this way, this section will investigate some 
variables that can be associated as social factors, mainly focusing on a cohesive social entity 
ideology that maybe related to Islamophobic sentiments. This section also will study the 
relationship between Orientalism and Islamophobia in order to understand the background of 
the ideology in South Korean history. 
The third factor related to Islamophobic sentiments in South Korea is religious 
discourse: Religion is used to justify Islamophobia, in particular with the Korean Protestant 
churches. Some conservative Protestants in the country have repeatedly produced negative 
images and hate speech about Islam through media, and have gone to the streets to 
demonstrate in anti-Muslim campaigns. Some fundamentalist missionaries have openly 
warned church leaders and Christians of gradual Islamization. These groups have elevated the 
degree of their argument couple with the ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks by focusing on their 
brutality and the potential threat to Christianity in South Korea. Therefore, it is meaningful, 
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in this section, to explore the structural role of Protestants and why negative perceptions 
about Islam and Muslims are pervasive in South Korean churches. In this way, this section 
will reveal the relationship between Protestantism and Islamophobia in the country. 
The fourth factor that may contribute to Islamophobia is deep-rooted images of Islam 
and Muslims through media coverage and stereotypical rhetoric that justifies anti-Islam 
attitudes by framing Muslims as potential security threats. This factor can play a role in 
contributing to the spread of negative images about Islam and Muslims in Korean society. In 
fact, the media, which can heavily influence society, has a tendency to condone Islamophobic 
attitudes in the name of ‘freedom of speech’ (Bryfonski, 2012). The social and economic 
problems make the public more susceptible to populist rhetoric that is exacerbated by the 
media (Bonansinga, 2016). In this sense, this section will investigate how mass media in 
South Korea deals with Islam and Muslim issues. This section also will attempt to explain the 
background of the tendency of South Korean media’s reports regarding the Middle Eastern 
issues. 
The last factor that may contribute to Islamophobia is online media platforms in 
South Korea. In particular, social media has recently become the platform of conservative 
groups for spreading negative images about Muslims. To some extent, the role of social 
media is comprehensible because a clear characteristic of social media is that it tends to allow 
the propagation of exotic, strange, and weird issues from attracting attention of the general 
public. However, it often allows for the portrayal of some negative events involving Muslims 
as religiously motivated, while providing viewers and readers with accessible nuggets of 
prejudice and misperceptions towards Muslims through specific frames. Additionally, social 
media has also strengthened anti-Muslim sentiment by spreading hate speech about Islam and 
Muslims in South Korea. Therefore, it is important to analyze how Protestants use mass and 
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social media in order to spread their ideologies regarding Islam and Muslim issues in this 
section. 
 
History of Muslims in South Korea  
The history of Korean contact with Islam goes back to hundreds of years. Although 
Korean sources from the Silla Dynasty (B.C 57-A.D 935) mention nothing about Islam, 
Muslims, or Arabs, there are some references to the Korean peninsula in early world 
geographies by Muslim scholars (Baker, 2006). The Korean peninsula’s first encounter with 
Islam was during the Goryeo Dynasty (A.D 918-1392), which followed the Silla dynasty, 
when a few Central Asian Muslims moved into Korea (Baker, 2006). According to Lee Hee 
Soo, a Korean researcher of history and Muslim-Korean relations, the first such reference 
appears in Ibn Khurdadbih’s General Survey of Roads and Kingdoms, which was published 
in the mid-9
th
 century (H. Lee, 1997). Despite these early encounters, the religion of Islam 
and the Islamic community was not present in the Korean peninsula in this period. Not only 
are there no records of Muslims from 1427 through 1910, there was not much Muslim, Arab, 
or Central Asian influence on the peninsula during the Chosen Dynasty, which followed the 
Goryeo Dynasty, and which is often labeled a “Hermit Kingdom” (Baker, 2006). After the 
end of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the collapse of the Chosen Dynasty, Turkish forces 
reached the country through a United Nation’s peace-keeping mission in support of the South 
Korean government (H. Cho, 1990). During the Korean War, the South Korean people often 
witnessed the practice of Islamic prayers by these soldiers, and even showed interest in this 
religion. Due to Turkish troops who stayed in South Korea, a true Korean Muslim community 
finally started to appear in the 1950s (Baker, 2006). Although those Turkish soldiers did not 
come to Korea to convert Koreans into Muslims, they did not turn away Koreans who came 
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to join them in their prayers (Ibid). Some Koreans who had become Muslim who lives in 
Manchuria, which is located in northeast China, spoke to the imam of the Turkish forces and 
agreed to help them form a Korean Muslim Community Center in 1955 (Ibid). Within one 
year after a formal Korean Muslim Community Center was established, it had over two 
hundred members (Ibid). One of the leaders of the Muslim community in South Korea, Umar 
Kim Jin-Kyu along with Sabri Suh Jung-Kil, visited Mecca, becoming the first Korean to 
carry out Hajj (Baker, 2006). The small Muslim community in South Korea grew between the 
1960s and 1970s, fueled partially by religious conversions among Korean construction 
workers who went to the Middle East to work on mega projects such as power plants, 
factories, and aqueducts (Her, 2015). In 1976, the Korean Central Mosque, which is still the 
biggest mosque in the Korean peninsula, opened on a hill in Itaewon, in Seoul, South Korea. 
Since the establishment of this small Muslim community in the middle of the 20
th
 century, 
some Muslim migrant workers in South Korea have married to native Korean women and 
some Koreans have converted to Islam.  
Coinciding with this relatively recent increase in Muslim migrants to South Korea, 
the country has experienced anti-Muslim sentiments after 9/11. Although there were little 
anti-Muslim attitudes at the beginning of 20
th
 century, these increased after 9/11 and 
following an incident where South Korean citizens were kidnapped by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in 2007 (S. Her, 2015). Although it is not clear exactly when anti-Muslim 
sentiments started appearing in South Korea, it has grown little by little since 2008 (J. Lee, 
2011). Afterwards, the hostile feelings among South Koreans have grown stronger over the 3 
years after the rise of ISIS as hate speech towards Muslims has increased on social media. 
Hate speech is usually defined as speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, 
religion, ethnicity or national origin (Rosenfeld, 2002). At the same time, anti-Islam 
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campaigns often have been held in the streets. As the number of South Koreans who have 
shown more interest as well as concern regarding Islam and Muslim issues has increased, 
some conservative groups such as right wing politicians and Protestants have even 
demonstrated their hostility towards Muslims by protesting against the building of a Halal 
food factory and Islamic finance funds in the country. According to the report of National 
Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK, 2010) disrespect, slander, and threat towards 
foreign migrants including Muslims has emerged in contemporary times though there are no 
official statistics on hate crimes against Muslims in South Korea. After NHRCK monitored 
the expression of racial discrimination on local major portal sites in 2010, it suggested an 
applicable policy improvement to the South Korean government in order to prevent someone 
from spreading hate speech.  
 
Religious Demographics of South Korea 
 In South Korea, there has been a religious transition for decades. Although the 
Christian and Buddhist populations in the traditionally Confucian Korean society have 
increased since the Korean War, Islam has not attracted many Koreans to mosques. In 
particular, the number of Christians has grown dramatically from 1.1 million to more 14 
millions in South Korea since the 1960s (H. Lee, 1997). Like Christianity, Buddhism has 
grown from a couple of million adherents in the 1960s to over 10 million today while the 
number of Muslims reached only 145,000 during the same period (Baker, 2006).  
Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists have been the three main religious groups for 
decades in South Korea (Cho, 1990). The rate of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Buddhism 
in total religious population in South Korea reached to 98% in 2005 (Ibid). Regarding this, 
there may be three important reasons in explaining why the Muslim population has not 
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increased like Christians and Buddhists in South Korea. The first reason for the limitation of 
the spread of Islam results from the strict demands that Islam requires, which can bring about 
a clash with Korean social norms (Baker, 2006). Since Korean society is ethnically and 
culturally homogenous and very group-oriented, it exerts strong peer pressure to fit its social 
norms (Ibid). Under this circumstance, Muslims usually face challenges in the workplace or 
at school when they want to pray five times a day but are surrounded by Christians, 
Buddhists, and atheists in South Korea. For instance, during Ramadan, most Muslims who try 
to adhere to the month-long daytime fast cannot escape the questions and requests for 
information regarding religion and the necessity to observe social norms. In South Korea, 
there is also a large number of atheists. According to the 2005 South Korean Official Census, 
47% of total population was considered atheists. The atheist population has gradually 
increased and surpassed the half of total population: from 42.5% in 1985 to 53% in 2005 (S. 
Ryu, 2009). Thus, as Don Baker (2006) points out, there is social pressure on Muslim 
community not to act differently from those around them. 
The second factor limiting the influence of Islam in South Korea is that it is a 
relatively unknown religion in the face of the two dominant religions: Christianity and 
Buddhism. Although South Korea has moderately transformed into a multicultural society, it 
still has different standards when judging Islam as compared to Christianity and Buddhism. 
Due to the huge influence from Western culture and religion, especially from the U.S. after 
the Korean War, there was a favorable perception of Christianity over other religions such as 
Islam (Baker, 2006). Moreover, since the fourth century C.E., South Koreans have gradually 
become accustomed to the religious norms of the Chinese. This tendency helped to create a 
gap between dominant religious groups and minority religious groups, which may facilitate 
the dominant group’s ability to take negative action against minorities such as Muslim 
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community. 
The third reason why Islam has perhaps failed to attract the interest of South Koreans 
is related to the misperceptions about Islam among them. Since the 1960s, there has been a 
tendency to consider Islam a religion for foreigners, which is reinforced by Islam not making 
more headway in South Korea (Baker, 2006). Under these circumstances, dominant religious 
groups such as Christians and Buddhists could enjoy relatively higher status and greater 
privileges than minority groups like Muslims (Wirth, 2005). As a result, both Christianity and 
Buddhism in South Korea have become the dominant religious groups for a long time, while 
Islam has been relegated to the status of a minority group. 
 
Definition of Islamophobia 
Islamophobia can refer to prejudice coupled with feelings of fear or dislike toward 
Muslims (Lee et al., 2009; Sheridan, 2006; Abu Raiya, 2008). The main concept of 
Islamophobia is similar to other forms of prejudice and discrimination. One general trend in 
the literature on Islamophobia is defining it as a specific form of religious ‘xenophobia’ 
characterized by fear and prejudice against Islam (Hopkins, 2006; Alghorani, 2003). Sheridan 
(2006) argues, for instance, that intergroup prejudice towards Muslims increased following 
9/11 with Islamophobic attitudes often bringing about social tension between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. This social tension can fuel social problems because it can lead to the 
perpetration of hate crimes against Muslims. In this context, Islam is not only a religion, but 
also a broad, comprehensive way of life and the purpose of human existence (Denny, 2011; 
Kamis & Muhammad, 2007). This has important implications for the way society responds to 
the problem. 
The term of Islamophobia has a long history despite a suggestion that Islamophobia 
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is a new phenomenon in the contemporary world. Islamophobia, which currently refers to the 
fear or hatred of Muslims and Islam, has been used to describe anti-Muslim feelings of a 
mostly Christian population in Europe (Ogan, 2014). The first attempt to recognize 
Islamophobia as a form of discrimination in the academia and the media can be traced back to 
the 1990s. Before Islamophobia was acknowledged as a type of discrimination against 
Muslims, it was called by different terms such as Orientalism (Allen, 2010). In terms of the 
word Islamophobia, it was first recorded in print in an American periodical, Insight employed 
by Tariq Modood (Allen, 2010). A few years later, the first British non-Muslim 
acknowledgement of Islamophobia was made in the Runnymede Trust report in 1994 (Ibid). 
This first attempt to contribute to the specification of the concept was from a report titled 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All published by the Runnymede Trust (Bonansinga, 
2016). This NGO based in the U.K. analyzed in an empirical and comprehensive way how 
Islam is viewed by Islamophobes: It is seen as a barbaric, primitive, violent and sexist 
religion, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a clash of civilizations (Runnymede Trust, 
1997). The concept of Islamophobia became more widely used following the impact of this 
report. The most comprehensive study of Islamophobia following 9/11 was conducted by the 
European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, which examined Islamophobic 
sentiments and discrimination across fifteen European countries (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). 
Sheridan (2006) and Poynting (2004) examined whether intergroup prejudice against 
Muslims increased since 9/11 in the United Kingdom and Australia. In this sense, Martin-
Munoz (2010) defined Islamophobia as a form of discrimination and prejudice specifically, 
as a “construct in which a monolithic image of us and them” in two separate cultures is 
created. From this perspective, Muslims are often perceived as “alien, separate, inferior, 
fanatic, fundamentalist, and irrational” with no common values with the West (Ava, 2013). 
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This conceptualization of Islamophobia is related to other forms of prejudice and 
discrimination that can be expressed and experienced in a variety of contexts and settings 
such as educational settings and the work place (Ava, 2013).  
Meanwhile, Islamophobia may be expressed overtly or covertly, both being 
considered as hate crimes (Sheridan, 2006). These examples include abusive calls and 
messages toward Muslims, and treating Muslims with suspicion, staring, leaving one out of 
conversations, and asking a Muslim individual to speak for other Muslims in general (Ava, 
2013). Others may involve Islamophobic content in email, text message, blogs, mass 
communication, or social media (Sheridan, 2006 & Awan, 2014). Overall, Islamophobic 
views are shaped by a ‘closed set’ of narrow views on Islam and Muslims, which has helped 
contribute to “othering” (Awan, 2012). For this reason, differentiating between “us” and 
“them” can lead to discriminative practices and further Islamophobia (Awan, 2012). 
 
Islamophobia and Hate Crimes 
In order to understand the possible Islamophobic sentiments in South Korea, it is 
significant to explain the general worldwide perceptions about Muslims and Islam, especially 
if we appreciate the impact of free movements of Muslim migrants from the Middle East and 
its role in the spread of information and ideas. 9/11 in 2001 and the rise of ISIS in 2014 seem 
to have contributed to increase in anti-Muslim attitudes including hate crimes in the West. 
For example, some studies exploring the effect of 9/11 have demonstrated that the attack led 
to greater levels of anti-Muslim hate crimes in several Western countries (Coryn, Beale and 
Myers, 2004). Also, there appears a vicious cycle of pro-ISIS extremism and anti-Muslim 
hostility since 2014 (Mitts, 2017).  
Although hostility toward Muslims escalated after 9/11, it has deep roots in the 
24 
 
history of Europe. The tension between Christians and Muslims can be traced back to the 7
th
 
century with the founding of Islam (Bryfonski, 2012). This tension increased over the 
centuries and resulted in a series of nine wars, called the Crusades, which stretched from the 
end of the 11
th
 century through the 13
th
 century and began as a conflict over possession of the 
‘Holy Lands’ (Ibid). The Crusades worsened relations between Christians and Muslims while 
also creating distrust that continues to this day (Ibid).  
The wave of hate crimes against Muslims in the U.S. began in the wake of 9/11 
(Kaplan, 2006). In 2001, according to the U.S. Department of Justice record, there was a 
1,600 % increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes between 2005 and 2006 (Read, 2008). The 
typical and legalistic definition of hate crime is “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice 
based on race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” (Perry, 2001) The research conducted 
by Pew Research Center just after 9/11 also showed that the incident caused the dramatic 
increase of negative images about Islam (Kim, 2016). According to a Pew Research Center 
report (2010) that analyzed the news coverage for the week of 6-12 September, the second 
most covered topic was anti-Muslim sentiment, filling 15% of the news hole. In this regard, 
Christine Ogan (2013) argues that there has been an increase in Islamophobic discourse in 
most Western European countries including France, Germany, the U.K., Italy, and Spain. At 
the same time, this research demonstrated that over two thirds of American responders 
answered they had more interest in news reports regarding Islam (Kim, 2016).  
Furthermore, the events of 9/11 have contributed to motivating an increasing 
securitization framing of the Islamic world and the Muslim community, especially, within 
Western academia. Some research has argued that 9/11 affected the increase of anti-Muslim 
sentiment, discrimination, and hate crimes toward Muslims in the United States. Additionally, 
9/11 stirred up hate crimes and debates on religious conflict discourse between Islam and 
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Christianity. In the aftermath of the 9/11, for example, some Western researchers found that 
one of the biggest predictors of discriminatory behaviors and hate crimes was visual 
appearance: the physical traits and objects that identify an individual as Muslim (Saedi, 2012). 
Their studies provide similar findings according to the widespread characteristic of post 9/11 
Islamophobia. At the same time, the idea of a clash of civilizations between Christianity and 
Islam was reinforced with focus on influencing Western public opinion (Bonansinga, 2016). 
Since 2014, the emergence of ISIS has refueled the anti-Muslim sentiments 
worldwide. Most European countries and the U.S. have experienced strong and pervasive 
Islamophobic feelings and attitudes after the emergence of ISIS. Similar to what occurred 
after 9/11, the attacks conducted or inspired by ISIS have led to an increase in political and 
security discourse warning of the danger of extremism and radicalization as well as anti-
Muslim sentiments in Europe, the U.S, and East Asia. The clear example of this can be seen, 
in the U.S., where recently elected president Donald Trump has fueled Islamophobic 
sentiments by using anti-Muslim rhetoric since the beginning presidential campaign in 2016. 
Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, including actions like calling for “Muslim immigration bans” 
and “making the desert glow,” manifest the intense political Islamophobia that has gripped 
U.S. politics and promoted more Islamophobic feelings and incidents in these countries 
(Beydoun, 2016). There has been similar anti-Muslim and anti-refugee rhetoric during the 
election campaigns in Europe over the past couple of years, including France, Austria, and 
the Netherlands. These campaigns have not only centered on the continued immigration of 
Muslims into their countries, but also focused on proposing hostile actions regarding 
Muslims already living in their countries. For instance, in France, there has been a 
controversy surrounding a ban of the Burquini, which is a swimming suit for Muslim women. 
Some Muslims protested against the banning of the Burquini on beaches, but the French 
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government still sticks to the policy that does not allow the wearing Burquinis. Debates like 
these seem to be emerging more frequently in France and other European countries following 
a series of terror attacks in Europe.  
Moreover, the refugee crisis resulting from ISIS threats and conflicts in Syria have 
fueled anti-Muslims sentiments, while negative perceptions like security threats of Islam have 
spread throughout the world. As anti-Muslim attitudes have increased after rise of ISIS, the 
possibility of hate crimes against Muslims has become high due to the reaction to a series of 
incidents related to Islamic militants. For instance, Tamar Mitts (2017) suggests that highly 
visible actions by Islamists including ISIS drive further anti-Muslim hostility while this 
hostility leads to Islamist radicalization, illustrating a vicious cycle of radicalization and anti-
Muslim hostility. 
The dramatic increase of migrants and refugees from Muslim countries inside Europe 
has led to cautious feelings toward Muslims and xenophobia spreading rampant in the West 
due to the different religion, language, and culture. Recently, European countries are key 
destinations for refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran while the majority of them 
try to continue on to Germany (Amnesty, 2013). Thus, the ‘border countries’ of the EU are of 
special interest in terms of their dealings with the refugee issue. Concerning the Muslim 
community in Europe, France is home to an estimated 10 percent of Muslims; whereas 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland host about 6 percent. However, a common 
strategy uniting all EU member states has not yet come into being (Hafez, 2015). For this 
reason, every EU member state is left quite alone in dealing with the refugee and migration 
issues. Consequently, this has threatened the Schengen Treaty, which allows for unimpeded 
travel within the EU designated zone. 
Equally significant is the fact that the current migrant and refugee crisis has fueled 
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security discourses in the West, which tend to frame Muslims as potential threats. As 
animosity towards Muslims in the West has been rising in recent years, anti-Muslim hostility 
is reflected in the increasing support given to far-right parties in Europe (Burrows, 2016; 
Mitts, 2017). These sentiments have sometimes led to setting fire to mosques, spreading anti-
Muslim graffiti, and physically attacking those who practice Islam in Europe (Mitts, 2017). 
For instance, right wing politicians in the West used anti-Muslim rhetoric in order to win 
elections. Several scholars suggest that far-right voting is strongly linked to anti-Muslim 
attitudes (Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008). In this sense, Tamar Mitts (2017) argues that there is 
a close correlation between holding anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes and self 
identifying as a far-right supporter or voting for far-right parties because local-level support 
for far-right parties can reflect an atmosphere of anti-Muslim hostility.  
The refugee crisis has been regarded as the most serious problem in Europe since the 
Second World War (Hafez, 2015). According to UNHCR, 38 European countries received 
264,000 asylum applications. UNHCR counted more than 4 million Syrians affected by the 
refugee crisis since 6 September 2015 (Hafez, 2015). This number includes 1.9 million 
Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey and 2.1 million people registered in Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon combined while the number of refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan 
has increased as well (Hafez, 2015). The figure for the number of refugees in the main host 
countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) was 2.2 million (Hafez, 2015). The 
figure for the total number of refugees from Syria globally was estimated 2.3 million in 2015 
(Ibid). However, this is only the number of those who have registered with UNHCR, and 
does not include the migrants who are unregistered. Some European countries have offered 
resettlement and humanitarian assistance, but eighteen EU member states including the U.K. 
and Italy have not made any resettlement or humanitarian admission pledges (Amnesty, 
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2013). In short, as the number of refugees has increased in the Western countries, the 
constructed security and political discourse has framed the migration crisis as a crisis that can 
lead to the threat of security. 
From this point of view, one can identify three main incidents that have impacted 
global perceptions about Muslims; 9/11, the rise of ISIS and a series of terror attacks related 
to the group, and the refugee crisis following the civil war in Syria. In fact, these factors have 
played a significant role in supporting Islamophobic attitudes that have been propagated, 
especially in the West. 
There is a lack of discussion, however, regarding hate crimes in South Korea. There 
are even no clear legal systems that have been created to regulate hate crimes or hate speech 
against locals or foreigners, including Muslim migrants (T, Kim, 2015). In South Korea, it is 
difficult to criminalize hate crimes against Muslims because there are not criminal laws to 
regulate hate crimes or hate speech towards Muslims. There is not even a legal definition of 
‘hate speech’ or ‘hate crime’ in South Korea. Although the opposition party has tried to pass 
legislation that regulates hate speech for several years, it has failed to pass in parliament 
because the dominant ruling party did not support the bill. Moreover, the conservative civil 
groups and some Christians strongly protested that if the bill was implemented, it would 
damage Christians’ freedom of evangelism and missionary activities while it is provoking 
homosexuality (Kuk-Min Ilbo, 2016). For this reason, there has been no official statistics 
regarding hate crimes and regulation banning hate speech, leading society to rely on self-
regulation, which has not affected or changed the spread of anti-Muslim attitudes in South 
Korea.  
This lack of legal protection for the Muslim minority can contribute to deep-rooted 
misperceptions and prejudices regarding Muslims, allowing discrimination against them to 
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thrive. This phenomenon in turn has prevented Muslim migrants from attempting to integrate 
into the South Korean society and has consequently made it easier for Islamophobic 
sentiments to remain largely unchallenged. In this regard, some Korean researchers suggest 
that the rights of minority groups including the Muslim community should be protected from 
hate crimes or hate speech by legislation. 
Moreover, there are no official statistics on hate speech or hate crimes in the country. 
The type of hate crimes happening in South Korea are different from those in the U.S., which 
mainly derived from discrimination based on different races and nationalities (T. Kim, 2015). 
In South Korea, hate crimes are often regarded as social crimes based on the gap between 
rich and poor, social complaint, individual resentment, women-phobic sentiments or 
nonspecific motive crimes in media coverage (T. Kim, 2015). This may sometimes make 
South Koreans understand the concept of hate crimes differently compared to the U.S.’s case. 
In addition, there is no relevant law, like the hate crime statute laws in the U.S. For this 
reason, it is difficult to figure out the reality of the problem in South Korea (M. Yang & H. 
Lee, 2008). Although a few South Korean lawmakers from the opposition party in 2016 tried 
to pass a bill regarding hate crime statute laws, which do not allow discrimination based on 
religion, sex, race, and age, they failed because some conservative groups including right 
wing ruling political party and the Christian community were against the bill and lobbied to 
discard it (J. Kim, 2011). Some Protestant missionaries have tried reminding church leaders 
and communities of Islamization of European countries such as U.K., France and Germany (J. 
Lee, 2011). Lee (2011) argues that this seems their strategy of escaping of their struggles 
from a decrease in believers and criticism from the civil society while attributing their own 
problems to others. 
In addition to the recent political and media rhetoric regarding Muslims in the West, 
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many internet users have also shown their hostilities towards Muslim by posting hate 
comments and fabricated pictures on social media. Some recent figures show an increase in 
online anti-Muslim abuse (Awan, 2016). These manifestations of intolerance were propelled 
by the social tensions arising from a series of terror attacks related to ISIS and the world wide 
refugee crisis. Given the reality that supporters and loyalists of ISIS are still operating in 
Syria, Iraq and even some European countries, the Islamophobic attitude in the West is 
deeply rooted, and is further exacerbated by an increase of Muslim migrants and refugees.  
 To summarize, the spread of hostilities towards Muslims and negative attitudes in the 
West seem to have a close tie with three major incidents and trends: 9/11, ISIS-related terror 
attacks, and refugee crisis. An increasingly securitized discourse regarding Islam and 
Muslims in the West has utilized these events for the political and economic agendas of 
various groups, which in turn has fueled the increased hatred and condemnation of and 
against Islam and Muslims. This is particularly true of many conservative political and 
religious groups in Europe and the United States. In addition, continued economic problems 
have negatively affected public opinion further, making real security issues more vulnerable 
to populist rhetoric (Bonansinga, 2016). As a result, the situation of intolerance against 
Muslims has further worsened while significantly impacting Islamophobic phenomenon.  
 With this understanding of the main characteristics of Islamophobia in the West, 
including its origins and consequences, we have a clear starting point from which to analyze 
Islamophobia in South Korea. As has been hinted at above, the factors that have influenced 
the spread of Islamophobia in the Western countries are present in the South Korean case. 
This, along with the factors unique to South Korean history and its society, are an important 
background to understanding the rise of Islamophobia in this East Asian country. 
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CHAPTER 2: SECURITY DISCOURSE IN POLITICS 
 
 The aim of this section is to explore security discourse in South Korean politics. This 
section will discuss the history of security discourse, and foreign policy in South Korea. It 
will also show how security discourse related to Islam in the country has increased after 9/11 
and has been exacerbated after the rise of ISIS, which further influenced the spreading of 
Islamophobic attitudes. Security discourse in South Korea will be investigated through 
research papers and news coverage published. In addition, the debate surrounding the Anti-
Terrorism Act, which is related to security matters including responding to the global threat 
of ISIS, will be discussed in order to understand how the legislation process of the Act has 
impacted negative perceptions towards Muslims in South Korea. The findings in this section 
will demonstrate how the conservative ruling political party, intelligence authority, and civil 
and religious groups utilize the ISIS issues to contribute to increasing Islamophobic 
sentiments. 
 
Historical Background of Security Discourse 
Understanding the history of security discourse in South Korean politics is important 
because its background is related to the emergence of Islamophobic discourse in 
contemporary times. The perception of security-related threats has played a significant role in 
South Korea for decades. Historically, South Korean politics is rampant with security 
discourse. During the Cold War, a few authoritarian regimes have used the state and the 
division between South and North in the Korean peninsula to seize power and suppress 
opposition groups (S. Han, 2016). Military regimes such as Park Jung Hee’s (1917~1979), 
Jeon Doo Hwan’s (1931~present), Roh Tae-Woo’s (1932~present), who were former 
generals in the army, tended to depend on security measures in order to prevent opposition 
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groups from obtaining power and to attract public support mainly under the name of anti-
communism slogans between the 1970s and 1980s. Since South Korea experienced the 
Korean War, which began with the invasion of North Korea in 1950, the importance of 
national security has become a main tool of regimes and a point of focus for citizens because 
of the state of tension derived from the division of over seven decades (S. Kim, 2016). In fact, 
the military regimes in South Korea are key-actors in presenting and articulating security 
threats to the public. At the same time, they manipulated and controlled media coverage 
through which the vast majority of Koreans obtain information about issues of public concern. 
Therefore, it is said that politics in South Korea is strictly linked to the securitization 
processes. This tendency in South Korean politics can be considered a precursor to the 
security discourse utilized against opposition groups or minority groups today. 
The tendency to focus on security issues in South Korea may be a little different 
from the U.S. led War on Terror. In South Korea, the term “actors of threats” often refers to 
the North Korean regime due to the situation of division between South and North Korea 
after the Korean War. The two Korean regimes often focused on national security issues by 
cultivating tension between each other. In this way, national security issues raised by ruling 
military groups affected the fear of the South Korean people effectively and succeeded in 
attracting the supports of the majority of people. South Korea did not particularly show huge 
interest in security issues regarding Islam and Muslims before 9/11 (H. Cho, 1999). In the 
case of the U.S., the War on Terror has been mainly underwritten by the Islamophobic 
discourse focusing on perceived negative aspects of Islam and Muslims (Butler, 2008). 
Nonetheless in both cases, key events such as 9/11 have been employed in discourses that 
have contributed to the spread of Islamophobic attitudes by heightening the sense of the 
existence of a security threat.  
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Although the Middle Eastern issues have growing interest in the political, economic 
and academic fields recently, there was little interest of South Korea regarding the Islamic 
world until 1990s. Main interests related to the Middle East are oil, export industry, and 
terrorism in the government policies and research (S. Lee, 2009). There may be two main 
reasons in explaining the lack of interest in Islam at the beginning of modern history in South 
Korea: the first is a low Muslim population and the second is the South Korean government’s 
foreign policy. Regarding the first reason, Muslims in South Korea have made up a small 
number of the total population. Unlike the small number of Muslims in South Korea, the 
number of Christians has grown to more than fourteen million followed by the number of 
Buddhists at ten million currently (Baker, 2006). Moreover, South Korean society still 
appears to have little understanding or appreciation for the Muslim populations (S. Her, 
2015). These religious demographics explain the reason for the low interest in Islam in South 
Korean history. 
Secondly, the South Korean government has demonstrated very little interest in the 
Islamic world, and thus may not want to exert influence in the politics of the region. For this 
reason, the government has maintained a foreign policy of non-intervention within the 
politics of the Middle East. Historically, South Korea has not shown any intention of 
influencing the Islamic world directly from the political and military perspectives, instead, 
mainly focusing on economic matters. The South Korean government has not officially 
announced the direct support of military intervention against ISIS and Al-Qaeda. This seems 
to show that the government has been reluctant to influence the Middle Eastern political 
issues. 
South Korean foreign policy aims at maintaining a stable environment where it can 
increase its own benefits such as energy security including oil or natural gas imports and 
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manufactured goods exports to Middle Eastern countries (S. Lee, 2009). Although 9/11 
contributed to an increase of concerns about potential terror attacks in East Asia including 
South Korea, the foreign policy of the Korean government in the Middle East has been 
continually driven by a search for energy security and a desire to increase its overseas 
markets and investment opportunities (Chaziza, 2016). Consequently, there is not much 
provocation that may lead extremists in the Middle East to participate in or incite domestic 
terrorist attacks in South Korea. However, the recent active debate regarding terrorism and 
Islamic militants led by right wing politicians in the country has contributed to the spread of 
anti-Islam attitudes among conservative groups such as Protestant churches. 
The nature of South Korean foreign policy in the Middle East has not changed 
dramatically, but there was an increasing of the discourse of extremism and radicalization, 
and anti-Islamic sentiments in the country following 9/11 and a series of terror attacks carried 
out by extremists, especially in Europe. As it has raised more worries about security due to 
the rise of threats of terrorism, Muslims in South Korea have been exposed to an increasingly 
belligerent security and political discourse. According to the reports of Huffington Post 
Korea, some conservative politicians and religious groups warned of the possibility of 
terrorists’ infiltration leading to an active discussion on Anti-Terrorism Act in  2015 and 
2016. In addition, two Christian newspapers ‘Kuk Min Il-Bo’ and ‘Christian Today’ reported 
a few Protestant groups had campaigns in the streets against the influx of Islamic funds while 
claiming the probability of Islamization at the time. Similarly, two South Korean researchers 
Joseph Yi and Gowoon Jung (2015) argued that this rise in Islamophobia is linked to South 
Korea experiencing a growing public debate about foreign migrants and related governmental 
policies.  
Like South Korea, other East Asian countries like China and Japan were affected by 
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the rise of ISIS threat and this contributed to the active security discourse. Both two countries 
have witnessed similar Islamophobic attitudes based on the security threats because of terror 
attacks in the West. Chinese researcher Lin Yi (2010) and Japanese researcher Hideki 
Maruyama (2007) proposed that the concept of Islamophobia may be relevant to the one in 
the West. In this way, Lin Yi (2010) introduced three primary criteria in explaining 
Islamophobia: prejudice or discrimination against Islam and Muslims, a specific ‘phobia’ 
against Islam or Muslims, and the War on Terrorism. Hideki (2007) also argued that Muslims 
living in Japan experience Islamophobia in the county that is one of the most homogeneous 
major nations in the world. 
 
Framing Security Threats in Korean Politics 
The rise of ISIS and Paris Terror Attacks between 2014 and 2015 hugely influenced 
security discourse in South Korea like it did in Western countries. Security issues regarding 
extremists or ISIS are discussed more heavily and frequently in Korean politics. Due to the 
rise of this security discourse focusing on anti-terrorism, Muslims and Islam are often linked 
much more aggressively with national security matters. Conservative South Korean 
politicians including the ruling party, the intelligence authority, and civil and religious groups 
have voiced their fears and concerns about Islam and Muslims in public places and the media.  
Firstly, right wing politicians in South Korea led to the security discourse in earnest 
regarding Islam issues while framing those issues as potential threats after the Paris Terror 
Attacks. In 2014, the ruling Saenuri Political Party again pursued an Anti-Terrorism Act that 
was deadlocked in parliament for several years while raising concerns of potential terror 
attacks. According to the report from Huffington Post Korea, the Saenuri Party often 
mentioned ISIS issues as a threat to security in order to pass an Anti-Terrorism Act in the 
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parliament. The party also emphasized that “the targets of the Act were suspects like a young 
Korean man in his 20s who joined ISIS and some young Koreans who are trying to join 
illegal militant groups linked to terrorism” (Democratic Law Research, 2016). One influential 
member of the party even stated that “it was difficult to find suspects of terrorism without 
Anti-Terrorism Act” (Huffington Post Korea, 2015). Another member of the same party 
stated that the NIS (National Intelligence Service) demanded legislative improvement such as 
the Act to obtain the terror suspects’ IP address on the internet because it was impossible to 
pursue them under current legal systems although it is not difficult to figure out the addresses 
(Huffington Post Korea, 2015). Similar controversial discourse appeared in the South Korean 
Presidential office while raising more concerns of excessive security frame. The former 
South Korean president Park Geun Hye, who led to Saenuri Party, stated in a cabinet council 
that “masked protestors should not be allowed in the streets because ISIS did so” in 
November 2015 (Han, 2016). Her announcement immediately raised controversy because 
according to her definition of ISIS, anti-government protestors were considered illegal and 
violent terrorists like members of ISIS. After the announcement, the ruling party strongly 
pursued the bill that organizers and protesters should not wear masks while distributing 
negative images at anti-government protestors. Although, this bill not allowing protesters to 
wear masks has not passed in parliament, the party and former its leader seemed to succeed in 
raising a fear of potential terror attacks spreading negative images about foreign Muslims 
regardless of the real threat of ISIS toward South Koreans. 
Furthermore, the South Korean NIS contributed to fueling similar security framing of 
Islam and Muslims by relating them to Islamic extremists and terrorism. Since 2015, the NIS 
has reported to parliament suspects linked with extreme groups or potential security risks 
who tried to join ISIS, though there have been no actual and direct threats in South Korea. 
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These reports published by the NIS were immediately published by all South Korean media 
outlets, consequently leading to more security discourse surrounding the ISIS issues. The NIS 
utilized ISIS issues in order to attract favorable public opinion regarding the Anti-Terrorism 
Act. For example, according to the Huffington Post Korea, the NIS reported to the parliament 
that “circumstances that some South Koreans attempted to join ISIS were revealed in detail” 
(Huffington Post Korea, 2015). However, the NIS did not suggest specific evidence, only 
explaining that “most of suspects asked detailed questions such as ‘how to enter the Syrian 
territory’, ‘what is the way to contact ISIS fighters’ on the internet” (Huffington Post Korea, 
2016). Although these questions are often found on South Korean portal sites, the NIS 
seemed to attempt to relate this curiosity to the ISIS threat without providing factual 
evidences. Nonetheless, there was not been concrete evidence to prove the suspects were 
closely related to ISIS members. In reality, the NIS was not likely to have an intention to be 
hostile towards Islam or Muslims, but these actions played a role in fueling anti-Muslim 
attitudes in South Korea. This is because the frame of security could contribute to building a 
public agenda regarding specific phenomenon like the rise of the ISIS threat. 
Moreover, a small fundamental Christian political party, named Christian Liberal 
Party took sides with the security discourse fueling anti-Muslim sentiments (K, Goo, 2016). 
This party partly consists of conservative small civil groups such as the anti-multiculturalism 
policy group, educational parents’ group, and people’s solidarity for healthy society, which 
hope to create a campaign in the streets and through conservative media. For example, the 
recently founded Christian Liberal Party fueled anti-Muslim sentiments in official political 
campaigns. The party which shows conservative ideology, for instance, created a slogan 
during the parliamentary election campaign in 2016 by using pictures and placards that 
focused on the brutality of ISIS stating the following, “Definitely stop homo-sexuality, Islam, 
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and anti-Christian law” (G. Koo, 2016). In addition, there appeared Islamophobic words such 
as ‘Against Laws related to Islam and homo-sexuality’ on the official pamphlet of Christian 
Liberal Political Party. This pamphlet includes the anti-Muslim sentences like ‘If 300,000 
Muslims live in Iksan City, where Hala factory is supposed to be built, this country would be 
fallen into the danger because of terror and Korean women would be dangerous due to the 
increase of raping’ (G. Koo, 2016). They even claimed, in appealing to over 10 million 
Christians in South Korea, that if the government does not tackle the influx of Muslims, the 
increasing numbers of them would become a significant national security threat (H. Kim, 
2016). This political party is not very popular and has failed to have official parliament 
members in South Korea, but these campaigns highlight how they attempt to link Islam with 
the increased fear of security from extreme militants like ISIS, while not providing evidence 
or proofs that support their assumptions. 
Similarly, 27 conservative civil groups, including a group calling for an anti-
multiculturalism policy campaign, have appealed conjointly to the government to stop 
integration policies, which aim to support foreign migrants in order for them to assimilate 
into South Korean society mainly in 2015 and 2016 (Kim, 2015). They sometimes claimed 
that “multiculturalism was already dead in Europe and that policy was proved as failure as 
support their claims” (Kim, 2015). By doing this, they continually demanded the government 
to end the multiculturalism policy. Although this anti-multiculturalism campaign did not 
receive widespread support from ordinary people in South Korea due to weak factual grounds, 
it clearly reveals its intention to attempt to undermine a multiculturalism policy (Kim, 2016). 
Thus, South Korea has witnessed a rise of Islamophobic phenomenon that shows political and 
social anti-multiculturalism slogans (G. Koo, 2016) 
Overall, the aftermath of rise of ISIS, the Paris Terror attacks, and other related 
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incidents, have contributed to the approval of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2016 (S. Han, 2016). 
This act, which had been pushed forward by the ruling party and the NIS since 9/11 in 2001, 
was finally enacted after 15 years. Although opposition parties and liberal civil groups have 
claimed that the Act could infringe on fundamental rights such as privacy because the bill 
allows authorities to use any means necessary regarding terrorism despite the strong power of 
the NIS, a comprehensive surveillance systems, and the ambiguity of the scope of terrorism, 
the ruling party succeeded in passing it (Kim, 2016 & S. Han, 2016). In this sense, it seems to 
be evident that security discourse in politics played a role in the passing of Act, as politicians 
deliberately portrayed Muslim migrants as a potential threat in South Korea. This security 
discourse also demonstrates that politicians can use this security frame for their own political 
benefit. 
The security discourse surrounding terrorism issues provides us insights into 
understanding the securitization process regarding the referent object of threat. The recent 
ISIS threat has led to the rise of the security discourse again in South Korea after 9/11. 
Although there has been no actual threat or direct indication that foreign Muslims could 
become a security threat or are a radicalizing group in South Korea, foreigners including 
migrant Muslims living in the country have been increasingly portrayed with suspicion within 
political agendas (H. Kim, 2014). Regarding this, Eum Han Jin (2015) argued that peoples’ 
negative sentiments towards foreign migrants, women, and homosexuals can more influence 
a social phenomenon than criticism on their class structures or political systems. Anti-
multiculturalism supporters in South Korea have tried to place their claims into political 
sphere based on hatred towards others (H. Kim, 2014).  
In South Korean politics, it is possible for ruling politicians and the state institutions 
including intelligence authorities to abuse or misuse the Anti-Terrorism Act because the 
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targets of Act are still unclear and the term ‘terrorism’ is ambiguous. In addition, there is still 
controversy and debate over this issue among political parties in South Korea. As the Act 
fueled the legitimizing political discourse against ISIS, it may have contributed to spread 
anti-Muslims sentiments indirectly by ruling and conservative groups who want to keep 
opposition groups in check. While the argument regarding the Act is on-going, it can fuel the 
spreading public hostility and Islamophobic sentiments within Korean society.  
This is also likely to be applicable to the securitization process, where the 
securitizing actors adopt the rhetoric of security to convince the audience of the existential 
nature of the threat (Donatella, 2016). Moreover, this demonstrates that once one specific 
issue has obtained the status of security threat, it automatically enters the policy agenda, 
while collective concerns legitimize the endorsement of state actions (Ibid). Consequently, 
security discourse has impacted on Islamophobic attitudes by spreading negative perceptions 
and prejudice towards Muslims in Korean politics.  
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL PRESSURE ON MUSLIMS TO CONFORM 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to investigate social discourse related to Islam and 
Muslims in the relatively mono-ethnic South Korean society. This section includes a brief 
discussion on the struggles faced by the Muslim community in the country, the rise of anti-
multiculturalism sentiments, and the assimilation of Muslims. The social discourse about 
Islam in the country has been prominent since the influx of foreign Muslim workers and after 
9/11, as well as since the emergence of ISIS. This section will explore how the Muslim 
community in the country has been negatively affected in several areas including foreign 
Muslim workers and their children in workplaces and schools. It will also analyze how the 
anti-multiculturalism debate has developed by looking through existing research. Finally, this 
chapter will shed light on how Muslim migrants have tried to adapt to the dominant secular 
society through a look at existing studies related to Muslims. This section thus hopes to 
demonstrate how social pressures on Muslims to conform to the lifestyle of majority have 
contributed to the exclusion of the Muslim community in South Korea. 
 
The Struggle of the Migrant Muslim Community in Korean Society 
Despite the growing presence of Muslims in South Korean society, they have been 
victims of misperceptions and ignorance over the past five decades, as both migrants and 
Muslims (H. Lee & W. Lee, 2005). This is partly due to the fact that South Koreans have 
little knowledge about Islam and deep-rooted tendency to focus on negative incidents of the 
Middle East (H. Cho, 1990). At the same time, Muslim workers typically encounter various 
challenges or conflicts of cultural distance between the home and the host Korean country (S. 
Her, 2015). This phenomenon became more pervasive following the 9/11 attacks, the 
kidnapping of 23 South Korean citizens by members of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2007, and 
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recent oversea terrorist attacks since the emergence of ISIS in 2014 (I. Eom, 2015: S. Her, 
2015). As a result of these negative incidents related to self-termed ‘Islamic militants’, South 
Korean society tends to frame Muslims as potential security threats, consequently sometimes 
leading South Koreans to reveal hostilities to them through hate speech. 
Although there is an increase of anti-Muslim sentiments, it is very rare to punish the 
perpetrators based on the current laws in South Korea, because there is not legislation or a 
legal mechanism for punishing hate speech and hate crimes. The only exception is an incident 
of hate speech towards a foreigner that happened in 2009 based on a criminal act. According 
to South Korean reports, a 28-year-old Indian professor, named Bonojit Hussein was verbally 
assaulted by a Korean passenger on a bus. The Korean man shouted, “You Arab, You Arab!” 
“You smell, you are a dirty guy! Fuck you! Fuck you!” After listening to these insults from 
the Korean man, Hussein filed a criminal lawsuit for contempt against him. In the end, the 
Korean man was ordered to pay around 1,000 USD dollars by the criminal court. The Korean 
man was guilty based on a criminal contempt charge because there is no relevant law that 
regulated the hate speech used (Lee, 2015). This racial discriminatory case shows that in 
cases of criminal contempt in South Korea, it seems to be difficult to be found guilty 
especially if the victims are from a specific region, class, or group. In this sense, most 
Muslims who have experienced hate speech or hate crimes are likely to be reluctant to take 
legal action because of the complexity of legal suit processes and the language barrier, 
though they were discriminated against based on their religion or appearance. Other contempt 
charge cases related to anti-Islam or anti-Muslim behaviors were not found in official 
documents and research papers in South Korea. 
Another similar Islamophobic incident linked to anti-Muslim sentiments happened in 
the country in 2016. A highly educated but unemployed South Korean man was arrested for 
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threatening to bomb the In-Chon International airport in protest of his unstable work situation. 
In the toilet of the airport, he left a coarse bomb with a memo written in Arabic, perhaps 
being inspired by the pervasive security discourse of the ISIS or other Islamic militant groups’ 
threat. Although there were no casualties, this incident showed that social tensions had begun 
to increase with the emergence of worldwide terror attacks. 
Furthermore, some studies in South Korea revealed that the rights to education at 
schools for foreign migrant families were neglected by the society (J. Choi, 2010; Kang, 2010; 
Moon, 2010). These studies found that there were still children of migrants who do not have 
an equal chance to childcare and they could not receive a preschool or official education, not 
only because parents are working outside their homes but also because their status is illegal in 
South Korea. For instance, according to a study by S. Kim (2010) the parents of 
undocumented children and some South Korean-born children of migrants had been deported 
since the implementation of strong crackdowns on undocumented workers in 2004. As a 
result, these migrants’ children were excluded from proper rights including national medical 
care service and public education, or were deported to the countries their parents came from 
(S. Her, 2015). 
As previously mentioned, the struggles of Muslims and slow acceptance of Islam in 
South Korea may be based on the mono-ethnic characteristics of its society. Due to South 
Korea’s homogenous make-up, in comparison to Western countries, there is little public 
debate on the issue of the integration of migrants and acceptance because South Korea has 
not had much experience with Islam (S. Her, 2015). This factor can explain why the South 
Korean society has not been very receptive to foreign Muslim migrants. Historically, South 
Korean society has been characterized by a monolithic culture considered as the sole 
determinant of Korean identity (Choi, 2010). This is a unique factor that may differentiate 
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South Korea from other Western countries that have an Islamophobia problem. For instance, 
the emphasis on unity among South Koreans creates a sense of national identity like “we-ness” 
or “one-ness” and this consequently contributes to the negative attitudes toward foreign 
Muslim migrants and non-Muslim migrants (Choi, 2010). In addition, continued Korean 
social and economic problems including inequality, unemployment, and recession have 
further worsened the attitude of intolerance towards Muslim refugees and migrants. 
Regarding this point, South Korean Researcher Jang (2010) argued that job security is a 
significant topic that affects people’s attitudes towards migrant workers. 
The fear of South Koreans to be associated with other “backward” countries such as 
developing Muslim majority countries has become greater than any potential comparison 
with the West (O. Lee, 2003). This fear has caused South Koreans to accentuate the 
differences between us and others by developing a vision of them as being hopelessly mired 
in underdevelopment and incapable of change for the better (O. Lee, 2003) Furthermore, 
most South Koreans have been aware of Islam after the colony of Japanese occupation 
between 1910 and 1945 followed by the Korean War. Then, South Korea fell under the 
control of the U.S. while Western culture flowed into the country until the beginning of the 
20
th
 century. In this sense, there is a possibility that the perception of South Koreans 
regarding Islam is based on an imitation and reproduction of the image developed in the 
Western countries. Regarding this point, Lee Ock Soon (2003) argues that South Koreans 
attempt to identify themselves as modernized people with the West despite cultural and 
historical differences, and refer to the image of the other countries of the Orient adopted by 
the Western literature, mass media, and education. She adds that this reproduced Orientalism 
has emerged as a mean to suppress other Oriental countries including the Middle East 
countries, blurring the dichotomy between East and West (Bhabha, 1994). In fact, the 
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negative images of Islam and Muslims created by the West are still pervasive in South Korea. 
These historical and social backgrounds might make South Korea a particularly cohesive 
social entity and its population particularly suspicious of Muslim migrant groups. 
This feature of social pressures on the Muslim community in South Korea can be 
analyzed using the social identity theory. This theory explains the origin and negative 
perception of threat as a consequence of self-categorization (Garcia-Retamero, 2007). As this 
theory puts it, individuals are likely to place themselves into social categories; such 
placement creates an “other” and overall the categorization process will lead to the 
emergence of prejudicial attitudes towards the out-group and a feeling of threat (Ibid). This 
implies that when power is unevenly distributed among the groups, both parties in the 
asymmetric relationship may have cause for alarm, especially the weaker side (Bonansinga, 
2015). This is likely to be applicable to the framework of securitization on specific issues like 
the rise of ISIS. In this way, a threat is defined as a situation in which one agent or group has 
either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group 
(Davis, 2000; Garcia-Retamero, 2007). Similarly, some researchers consider threats as 
functions of power asymmetries (Bonansinga, 2015).  
Another important factor contributing to some campaigns against minority group 
including Muslim migrants is linked with the concept of “blaming the victim” (Ryan, 1976). 
It may be done not only in regard to what are conventionally seen as racial groupings, but 
also in regard to religious minorities (Joseph Yi, 2015). The concept of the ‘victimization’ of 
minority groups is implemented in the context of Islamophobia because it may allow for the 
dominant group to take action against Muslim minority. The emergence of Islamophobia is 
based on the number and size of the community in the society while discriminating the 
minority group because of different skin color, race, language, religion, and culture. In this 
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sense, Islamophobia plays a role in convincing many that a ‘clash of civilizations’ will be 
inevitable and that essential and irreconcilable differences exist between “us” and “them” 
(Gottschalk, 2008). The root of this type of racist ideology towards Muslims is deeply 
embedded in the dominant definitions of prejudice in the West (Gottschalk, 2008). Currently, 
Islamophobic attitudes can also be found in South Korean society as dominant groups have 
groundless prejudice against Muslims. For this reason, Muslims living in South Korea are 
subject to the same kind of negative out-group stereotyping due to the difference between “us” 
and “them”.  
In contrast to South Korea, Western countries have had laws that prohibit and 
regulate anti-Muslim behaviors and hate speech for several decades. In particular, hate speech 
is considered as inflammatory, insulting, derisive, and threatening words against individuals 
or groups because of a difference in race, religion, or age (Lee, 2015). For example, the U.S. 
Civil Rights Act, established in 1965, banned discrimination based on skin color, religion, 
sex, origin, disability, and age. Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) in the U.S. attempts to regulate discrimination in applying for government positions 
by using a civil compensation system while there is no such a regulation in South Korea. In 
Europe, many anti-hate speech movements and legal actions have been taken by the 
European Union. As a result, the European committee succeeded in defining hate speech as 
all types of expressions that spread, incite, promote, justify anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and 
racial hatred (Lee, 2015). The British government also established the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act to regulate hate speech in 2006 and made an anti-discrimination law called the 
‘Equity Act’ in 2010 (Lee, 2015). In the case of Germany, its government punishes hate 
crimes based on ‘Volksverhetzung’ which prohibits public hatred and provocation. Although 
not a European country, in 1993 New Zealand also implemented the Human Rights Act, 
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which considers hate speech based on skin color and race as a criminal. Moreover, there has 
been a lot of research centered on defining and discussing hate speech and hate crimes in the 
West.  
 
Multiculturalism in South Korea 
Social pressures on the Muslim minority in the relatively mono-ethnic country have 
fueled anti-Multiculturalism sentiments. In South Korea, ‘multicultural’ is used as a specific, 
legal term for families consisting of a Korean national and a foreign spouse. Multiculturalism 
in the country may result from the growing demand on foreign labor in small and medium 
manufacturing industries. According to the Statistics Agency of Korea, around 2.2% of the 
total population is foreigners living in South Korea. Also, the Agency expected that the 
number of foreigners will represent 9.2 % of total population in 2050. Multiculturalism also 
is used to describe the presence of divisive racial and ethnic groups, and relevant government 
policies and normative ideas about accommodating diversity (Joseph Yi, 2015). Based on this 
concept of multiculturalism, the South Korean government enacted the Employment Permit 
System, which attempts to guarantee equal wages and labor rights for foreign migrants.  
Although, the policy of multi-culturalism has been pursued by the central and local 
government in South Korea beginning in the mid-2000s, it has faced an anti-multiculturalism 
backlash especially from conservative groups (H. Kim, 2016). Multicultural discourse in 
South Korea is largely concerned with an increasing of low-skilled foreign migrants from 
developing countries such as East Asian Muslim countries and mixed-race families (Yi, 
2015). South Korea was primarily exposed to cultural and religious diversity during the 
1990s and 2000s when a significant number of foreign workers, many Muslim, migrated and 
settled into the country. In the end, the South Korean President Roh Mu Hyun declared for 
the first time that, “it is irreversible for Korea to move towards a multiracial and a 
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multicultural society. We must try to integrate migrants through multicultural policies’ in 
2006 (Kim, 2010). The 2008 Multicultural Family Support Act promised significant benefits 
for families of marriage migrants or ‘multicultural’ (damunwha) families. 
However, anti-Multiculturalism campaigns have emerged since 2008 in South Korea. 
A small, vocal group of activists has created many Internet communities explicitly opposed to 
multicultural policies (Joseph Yi, 2015). The anti-Multicultural Policy was the largest in 
terms of registered users (10,815); I love Korea: The Citizen’s Solidarity was the most 
politically active and organized (Joseph Yi, 2015). Additionally, other sites appeared that 
were mostly conservative and opposed to multicultural policies, such as Daily Storehouse 
(Ilbe), which was one of the largest sites in Korea having 140,000 daily visitors (Gwak, 2013). 
After 9/11 and the rise of ISIS, the campaign against the multi-culturalism policy fueled anti-
Muslim sentiment in South Korea. This led to an increase in prejudice against non-Koreans 
who are seen as comparatively different due to skin color and language. Particularly, in 
respect to Muslims, there is a specific ‘phobia’ at work, which emerges from anti-
multiculturalism sentiments against minority groups including Muslims.  
Still, relatively homo-ethnic sentiments remain in South Korean society. For instance, 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination pointed out that emphasizing 
South Korea as a racially homogeneous country in the world was equivalent to racial 
discrimination, thus recommended that the government should stand on the front line of 
abolishing discrimination (National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2011). Moreover, 
the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) has expressed its concern about 
increasing discriminatory speech and acts against foreigners including Muslims. According to 
the report published by the NHRCK in 2011, there were some expressions that describe 
foreign migrants from the Middle East as dangerous people, linking to terrorism on the 
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internet, which allows for the increasing security measures against them. The NHRCK also 
showed that some internet users repeatedly stated and spread the following statement: “all 
Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims”.  
Moreover, Muslims in South Korea were often blamed after 9/11 and they felt 
discriminated against by the larger society, which created for them the sense of being 
separated and segregated within their own communities (Ji, 2011) While the situation of 
intolerance against Muslims has deteriorated after the rise of ISIS, there appears to be a 
revival of social tensions manifested by the rallying of some civil groups against Islam and 
Muslims in South Korea. Particularly, populist, right-wing sites and unemployed young 
people have expressed hostility toward migrant workers. Also, distorted news stories and 
rumors such as crimes committed by foreigners, have been uploaded and quickly 
disseminated among South Korean internet users. 
In this regard, Muslim migrant workers living in the country suffered from threats, 
harassment, discrimination and violence, which cause them to be alienated and further 
marginalized from the majority in the society (D. Kim, 2008; S. Kim, 2010). These 
circumstances have contributed to a prevailing discourse of victimhood in South Korea. This 
is related to the Muslim minority associated with small, ideologically homogeneous groups 
(Joseph Yi, 2015). Prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minorities such as Muslims 
has been increasingly embedded in anti-multiculturalism sentiments in the country. In short, 
the anti-multicultural discourse in South Korea has victimized minority groups, mainly 
concerning low-skilled foreign migrants from developing predominantly Muslim Asian 
countries and mixed families of foreign Muslims and native Koreans. This tendency 
gradually affected the discourse surrounding the multi-culturalism policy. Consequently, 
Muslims have faced vulnerability in South Korean society because of their religion and this 
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new challenge has increased the frustration of some members of this group. 
 
Muslim Integration and Social Interaction 
The Muslim community in South Korea has not faced serious hate crimes as in other 
Western countries, although there are anti-Muslim sentiments among certain sectors 
including conservative groups in the country. Ordinary Koreans do not express strong 
hostilities toward Muslims in the street. There are no reports of Muslims being attacked 
physically without reasons in South Korea. In addition, the Korean Central Mosque, which 
was established in 1976 in Itaewon, a central district in Seoul, has not faced direct threats of 
bombs or arson. 
Meanwhile, some Muslims living in South Korea have shown how they attempted to 
adapt to a secular society. They seem to compromise their religious practices, which show a 
tendency to attenuate their religiosity and move them toward secular ways (S. Her, 2015). In 
this way, a few Muslims focus on their work as their main priority, so they do not keep daily 
prayer times to work within a dominant secular environment in South Korean society (S. Her, 
2015). In order to collect a regular salary, many considered this temporary compromise on 
religious practices an acceptable part of living in the country (Ibid). For instance, one 
Bangladeshi participant from a South Korean study on Muslim migrants stated the following: 
“For me, it does not matter whether religious practices are performed or not. The purpose that 
I came to Korea is to work and earn money for my family” (S. Her, 2015). This compromise 
seems to come from the tacit pressure of South Korean society on Muslims to conform the 
social norms of the majority. After all, this phenomenon demonstrates how some Muslims 
working in South Korea attempt to move toward a secular way of life when they face the 
difficulties in performing religious practices within the South Korean society. In fact, they 
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suffer from various challenges in performing religious duties such as daily prayers, fasting 
during Ramadan, and Friday praying in the workplace because the rules in South Korea say 
the migrant workers should be working (Chang, 2010). Furthermore, many South Korean 
employers do not consider religious obligation an essential part of Muslims’ daily lives (S. 
Her, 2015). In reality, Muslim migrant workers were forced to try to live in a way that shows 
they have been assimilated into the larger South Korean society (Moon, 2010).  
Moreover, some other Muslims staying in South Korea depend on an in-group 
supportive Islamic community. This type of community can contribute to strengthen in-group 
ties, pride, and centrality (Ward, 2013). For instance, Indonesian Muslim workers have built 
networks to facilitate social interaction in South Korea (S. Her, 2015). Each Muslim 
community that came from Islamic countries has their own features, but Indonesian workers 
have built a more strong and organized network than other ethnic communities in South 
Korea. In this regard, they can feel closeness and togetherness with an in-group community 
while being proud of their ethnicity (Ibid). This network can enhance in-group solidarity and 
a sense of Muslim identity in the secular society (Ibid). These two paths show how Muslims 
in South Korea adapt in a secular society, highlighting how some view religious obligations 
as a matter of choice, not routine (Ammerman, 2003). Similarly, some Muslims in South 
Korea have shown their attempt to integrate into society by limiting or doing away with 
religious practices (S. Her, 2015). Although most Muslims may face adaptation difficulties in 
South Korea, they keep attempting to open the door to secular life styles in their own way. 
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CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 
 
The main aim of this section is to explore how religious discourse is used to develop 
and spread Islamophobic sentiments in South Korea. This section will demonstrate the 
influence of the Protestant church in South Korea and why Protestants might be acting 
against Islam and Muslims through campaigns, mass media, and social media. Also, it will 
show how some influential pastors and churches spread false information or hate speech 
towards Muslims. In this way, this section will analyze how the Protestants have fueled 
Islamophobic sentiments in South Korea. This research depends on existing papers, some 
Christian figures’ speeches, and daily newspapers associated with the Protestant church in 
South Korea. In addition, this section will review the root of Islamophobic information in 
Korean churches by investigating existing research. The finding of this section will show that 
South Korean Protestants have systematically contributed to the rise in Islamophobic 
discourse by repeatedly producing and spreading negative perceptions in the long term. 
 
Muslim and Christian Relations in South Korea 
In South Korea, the emergence of Islamophobic sentiments is closely related to the 
role of Christianity. In particular, the Protestant Korean church has disseminated negative 
images and representations of Islam, forming Islamophobic discourse (J. Lee, 2011). Some 
fundamentalist missionaries prophesize that a gradual Islamization is occurring in South 
Korea (J. Lee, 2011). They often argue that Islam is a violent religion and is a tool to oppress 
Muslim women (Ibid). They even posted photos of ISIS’s brutality when they were 
conducting an anti-Islam campaign in the street in 2015 and 2016. This kind of prejudice and 
negative perception is also being spread via the media and the Protestant church community.  
53 
 
Although it was not easy to find cases of “Islamophobia in the streets,” it has been 
frequently used amongst Protestants in South Korea recent years (J. Lee, 2011). The 
emergence of Islamophobic discourse can be traced back to around 2008 in South Korea. At 
this year, it was found that South Korean Protestants began acting systematically to form 
anti-Muslim sentiments (J. Lee, 2011). Since then, specific South Korean newspapers and 
television programs affiliated with the Protestant church have spread Islamophobic discourse 
in the society. For example, one of major Christian newspapers ‘Kuk Min Il-Bo’, the ‘Church 
of Love’, and Korean World Missionary Association (KWMA) held an international forum 
titled “Islam is Coming” while the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBC) screened a 
program titled “Islam, they are Swarming” (J. Lee, 2011). Another anti-Islam group named 
‘Halting Islamization Movement’ conducted a campaign against Islam in the streets of Seoul. 
According to ‘The Christian Today’, the leader of this group, Lee Man Seok (2009), who is 
an influential pastor, stated when launching the campaign that, “the doctrine of Islam is not 
peaceful, and its aim is to unite all the world through Islam by using measures and methods 
including lies, violence, murder, and terror.” (J. Lee, 2011)  
Moreover, a South Korean researcher Koo, Gi-Yeon (2016) argued that some 
influential bloggers and Twitter users seem to come from a Christian background in South 
Korea since 2015. By doing so, they have called for the government to take specific measures 
to block the building of mosques as well as the influx of Islamic funds into the country. In 
order to achieve their goals, some Protestants went to streets showing hostility towards 
Muslims while attempting to connect them with ISIS. 
The rise of conspiracy against Islam and Muslims based on the Western sources has 
fueled Islamophobic discourse. The documents titled ‘The Strategy of 8 Steps for 
Islamization’ assumedly published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a role in 
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spreading Islamophobic discourse in South Korea (J. Lee, 2011). The documents included 
content about how the Muslim minority gradually occupies specific countries from the 1
st
 
step to the 8
th
 step by using an elaborate strategy. The Protestant groups have made videos 
based on this CIA documents and have disseminated them online and around churches (J. Lee, 
2011). According to the research, the video depicts Islam as a horrible religion and led to the 
fear of Islam spreading. As a result, the video rapidly spreads to Korean churches through 
their websites and it influences the Protestant community though the content of the video 
proved to be false (D, Kim, 2009). In fact, the majority of the Protestant churches’ claims are 
based on incorrect information and misperceptions (J. Lee, 2011). Similarly, some South 
Korean Protestants have warned of the possibility of terror attacks by Muslims, stating that 
“the Muslim population is below 1% in Korea, so they pretend to love peace and restrict 
violent activities until they have stronger power” (M. Lee, 2009). A few Protestants even 
revealed their hostile attitudes toward Muslims while assuming that they were potential 
threats like ISIS members or extreme Islamists. 
The influence and increase of the number of Protestant populations may help explain 
these growing anti-Muslim attitudes in South Korea. According to the Kuk Min Il-bo, those 
who do not like the influx of Muslims to South Korea are predominantly Protestants (56.3%), 
followed by Catholics (30.7%), Buddhists (25.7%), and atheists (15.6%) (J. Lee, 2011). This 
poll shows that Protestants seem to be more cautious in their response to the influx of 
Muslims than other religious people. While there are ups and downs in population rate by 
religions in South Korea, according to national census the rate of Protestantism was rapidly 
raised from 16.1% to 19.7% between 1985 to 2015 (N. Yoon, 2017).  
A South Korean researcher Lee Jin Gu (2011) argued that the reason for this rather 
unreasonable hatred toward Muslims is related to the crisis within the Protestant church. He 
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suggested that the Protestant church has suffered from a decrease in believers as well as 
criticism from the civil society. In fact, the Protestant church has faced serious criticism from 
civil society groups due to their aggressive missionaries locally and internationally. For 
example, some missionaries have yelled in the streets or in front of main railway stations, “if 
you do not believe in Jesus, you will go to the hell”. Aggressive activities and provocative 
slogans by these missionaries is a major cause of recent criticism facing the Protestant church 
in South Korea. Even though the South Korean society is worried about the actions of the 
Protestant church, they played a role in contributing to anti-Islam attitudes by using a rhetoric 
strategy that differentiates between Koreans and Muslims. 
In addition, as previously mentioned, the Christian Liberal Party, which mainly 
consist of Protestants, has impacted the spread of Islamophobic sentiments. This party often 
revealed their anti-Muslim speeches during the parliamentary elections in 2016. This party 
pledged to prohibit Islam, anti-Christianity values, and homosexuality. Some Korean 
Protestants led protests calling for the rejection of the building of a Halal factory in South 
Korea. In this regard, Lee Jin Gu (2011) argued that some fundamental Protestant church 
leaders are using a strategy of diffusing Islamophobia in a way to escape its own problems 
and critical environment. These campaigns raised a controversy but the party failed to obtain 
seats in parliament. 
This phenomenon may reflect a religious and ideological worldview revealing the 
wish for a racially pure nation-state or a Christian Europe (Hafez, 2015). This phenomenon in 
Europe seems to be relevant because European identity is rooted in Christianity (Ibid). 
Similarly, Islamophobia has been linked to nationalism based on a historical review in 
Europe. For instance, racially based attacks against Muslims and foreigners intensified in the 
1980s and 1990s and then Islamophobia spread across Europe (Hafez, 2015). By exploring 
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these sentiments based on the assumption of an imagined Christian Europe, many politicians 
from nationalist, right wing political parties, and conservative Christian camps attempted to 
spread a security discourse stirring hatred and dividing people against an imagined threat. 
Furthermore, many politicians justified Islamophobia by portraying Islamic culture and 
tradition over the status of Muslim women as victims of an oppressive Islam. These concerns 
were voiced to elicit support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2012). Therefore, 
conservative Christian camps in Europe may be able to reproduce Islamophobic discourse 
strategies by using the typical religious rhetoric against Muslims. The dynamic of group 
differentiation through religious discourse can be achieved through the negative 
representation of Muslims and Islam (Ahmed, 2012). 
However, the case of Islamophobia from a religious perspective in South Korea may 
be different from Western cases, to some extent. In the West, as Islamophobia has spread 
across Europe, there have been activities that regulate and prohibit hate crimes toward 
Muslims. This is because most European countries have shown that hate crimes against 
Muslims are serious crimes and social problems. Additionally, the reason for Islamophobia in 
Europe mainly resulted from actual terror attacks in their territory combined with an increase 
in the Muslim population, a failed immigration policy, and the emergence of far right-wing 
parties. On the contrary, the phenomenon of Islamophobia in South Korea has been built not 
in the streets, but in the type of discourse among conservative groups. This shows that the 
expression of Islamophobic sentiments is different between Europe and South Korea, though 
the reason for the emergence of Islamophobia is similar. 
  
57 
 
CHAPTER 5: ISLAM IMAGES IN MASS MEDIA 
 
 
This section investigates images associated with Islam and Muslims in South Korean 
news coverage and how these images spread through media platforms. This research is 
important because these images can be groundwork for understanding South Korean society’s 
attitudes towards Muslim community. Due to the influence of news coverage, South Korean 
traditional media such as newspapers and television has played a significant role in giving 
and rooting a general image and idea about Islam and Muslims. This section will explore how 
the South Korean mass media has described Islam and Muslims after it encountered them. 
Also, the main images associated with Islam and Arabs will be addressed by analyzing South 
Korean media coverage in daily newspapers and broadcastings. This research uses the 
method of content analysis of news articles in the Korean language. The outcome of this 
analysis will be to show how media has contributed to the spread of particularly negative 
images of Islam and Muslims, and consequently, has led to the exclusion of the Muslim 
community while fueling Islamophobic sentiments within the society. 
 
Islam and Muslim Images in South Korean Media 
There has been little research on the image or perception of Islam and Muslims in 
South Korea (S. Kim, 2016). There still remains a lack of textual research sources that 
describe the general image of Islam and Muslims via the lens of the South Korean media. 
However, some South Korean researches argue that there have been several signs that show 
Islamophobic attitudes are growing in the society. Only two surveys conducted by two South 
Korean researchers in 1990 and 2016 revealed that the South Korean media tended to focus 
on negative issues regarding the Arab world and that Korean responders who had negative 
images of Arabs were more numerous than the ones with positive references. The two 
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surveys are based on monitoring South Korean mass media since most Koreans received 
information regarding the Middle Eastern issues from televised news, newspapers, radio, and 
Internet (S. Kim, 2016). The results of these two surveys showed that opinions about Arabs 
and Islam in a comparative examination of public views have not changed thus far in South 
Korea. For instance, according to the website for the Ministry of Employment and Labor in 
South Korea, there were 1,500 comments that requested to exclude Islamic countries from 
labor supply countries and to end the government policy of multiculturalism (J. Lee, 2011). 
Moreover, the coverage of Muslims in South Korea seems to appear rather scarce, but with a 
significant focus on sensationalism. 
Korean researcher Cho Hee Sun (1990) conducted a study, titled ‘Arab’s image in 
Korean Society’, by analyzing daily newspapers for the first time in Korean academia. Cho 
used the term ‘Arab’ instead of Islam or Muslims because she considered it a common word 
that described the Islamic world in the minds of South Koreans though ‘Arab’ is the term of 
ethnic group related to its own culture or language without religion. Cho (1990) investigated 
the Arab image in relation to 52 articles published by the biggest Korean daily newspaper 
‘Chosun Ilbo’ for two months in 1987. The results demonstrated that the majority of South 
Koreans had negative perceptions of Arabs and Islam. They viewed Arabs and Islam as 
dangerous symbols related to war, terror attacks, and conflicts. Even though the articles dealt 
with various issues in the Arab world, most of them focused on negative associations. For 
instance, 18 of the 33 articles dealing with military and political issues in the Arab world 
were related to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, followed by 8 articles dealing with 
Iraq, 3 articles related to the Libyan issue, and 2 articles regarding the relationship between 
Turkey and Syria. The other 4 articles mentioned weapons, explosions, and kidnappings in 
the Arab world. Overall, this research revealed that 67% of the total articles dealing with the 
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Arab world shed light on military and political aspects. This proved that there were some 
stereotypical expressions that were assigned to Arabs: war, terrorism, kidnapping, explosion, 
seizure, weapons, victims, killed people, missiles, and other negative words (Cho, 1990). 
This framing could provide South Korean readers with negative perceptions of Islam and 
Muslims. For example, the endless conflict between Israel and Palestine would give the 
impression that it is almost impossible to reach a permanent peaceful agreement in the 
Middle East. In this sense, Cho (1990) argues that if an ordinary citizen were to be asked 
about his or her view of the Arab world, he or she would have likely mentioned wars, 
conflicts, and terrorism. On the other hand, if Koreans were asked the same questions about 
the West or the U.S., they would list some famous figures, movie starts, and celebrities 
instead of terror or conflicts (Cho, 1990). This result may have come from sources such as 
text books, films, pictures, and dramas that were framed by the West, so there were deep-
rooted differences between the images of the Arab world and the West (Cho, 1990). 
 Another survey conducted in 2016 provided similar results. A South Korean 
researcher Kim Soo Wan (2016) explored the main factors that determined current levels of 
awareness and attitudes of South Koreans towards Arabs and Islam. Like the previous 
research conducted by Cho (1990), Kim also used the term ‘Arab’ because it is a very 
common word that depicts the Islamic world and the Middle East. According to the results of 
the Kim’s research from 642 ordinary South Korean citizens, 75% responded that the 
strongest image of Arabs and Islam from the open-ended questions were negative aspects 
such as terror, war, conflict, and it being a dangerous area. These responders considered the 
Middle East as a region with continued turmoil and conflict between Arabs and the U.S. or 
Arabs and Israel (S. Kim, 2016). Other responses included: ‘oil rich countries’ (50%), ‘sterile 
natural environment’ (33%), ‘economic reconstruction’ (21%), ‘sex discrimination and 
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feudalistic social system’ (15%). These examples imply that negative perceptions about 
Arabs and Islam in South Korea were stronger than positive ones. Furthermore, the same 
research revealed that over 83% of the responders acknowledged the amount of negative 
news coverage on Arabs and Islam was larger than the positive one in South Korean media. 
From this perspective, Kim (2016) demonstrates that South Koreans have more negative 
images of Arabs and Islam because they are influenced by the negative tone of the Korean 
media. He also argued how the media focused on sensationalism, biased and non-objective 
reports on Arabs and Islam. This research shows the importance of people’s perception and 
attitudes toward Islam and Muslims as a result of their stereotypical depictions by media.  
According to a few South Korean studies, news coverage on Islamic issues has 
existed since the late 1970s, but most reports seemed to focus on negative aspects. There 
maybe two main reasons that explain the negative coverage of Islam and the Arab world. 
First, news coverage regarding Middle Eastern issues in South Korea heavily depends on 
Western media platforms from the U.S. and Europe. This limitation of access to information 
contributes to them following the framing that comes from the West. Secondly, some articles 
as a result of anonymity of sources are sometimes fueled by negative images of Islam and 
Muslims. These anonymous sources often targeted Islam and Muslims without factual 
grounds or impartiality. In this sense, Lorne L. Dawson (2004) writes that the, “Media is not 
neutral or passive conduits for the transfer of information. They mold the message in ways 
that crucially influence the world views we construct. They adjust our self-conceptions, 
notions of human relations and community, and the nature of reality itself” (Dawson, 2004).  
The crucial problem is that Western media outlets tend to focus on political and 
religious conflict issues and often use the framing of ‘clash of civilization theory’ suggested 
by the political thinker Samuel Huntington (1993) in order to analyze the Middle Easter 
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issues. Likewise, the South Korean media and reference books depicted the conflicts and 
disputes in the region as religious and cultural conflict between Muslims and Christians. A 
South Korean scholar on Islam, Cho Hee Sun (1999) argued that hundreds of studies and 
articles dealing with Islam and Arab issues do not use Arabic references, but depend on 
English ones. Another scholar on Islam in South Korea, Lee Hee Su (2016) also suggested 
that South Koreans have perceived Islam mainly through the lens of the U.S. media which is 
biased against the Islamic world and centered on the West. 
According to a study on the perceptions of Islam, Muslims are often depicted in a 
stereotypical and negative manner by Western media outlets from mainly the United States 
(“Western Media, 2005). This tendency, especially related to the Middle Eastern issues, may 
be a type of rhetoric based on deep-rooted negative perceptions toward Islam and Muslims. 
As mentioned above, the predominant stereotypes of Muslims in the media are that they are 
terrorists and oil-rich tycoons, while Muslim women are considered the victims of Islamic 
culture. Currently, the most well-known stereotype, the Muslim as an Arab terrorist, is one of 
the most common in South Korea. This is because Islam is continuously being depicted as 
violent, aggressive, threatening, and supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ (Muir, 2004). The second common stereotype is a bearded oil-rich tycoon that 
emerged during the oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s (Saedi, 2012). Theses stereotypes may 
lead to misunderstandings and negative perceptions concerning Islam and Arab people in the 
West, while resulting in rising discrimination based on different race, language, and culture 
(“Western Media,” 2005). Some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, argue that cultural 
differences are natural and lead to conflict (1993). For example, Huntington stated: 
“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world 
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. 
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Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but 
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and 
groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate 
global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines 
of the future.” (p.22) 
The concept of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ proposed by Huntington (1993) has been 
used in explaining the rise of Islamophobia. Huntington (1993) argues that the feature of 
international conflicts is based on the civilization conflict while civilizations are 
distinguished by religion, history, language, traditions and norms using examples of the 
Middle Eastern conflicts in 1990s. In this regard, the ‘clash of civilization’ concept has been 
often utilized to increase fear of an Islamic movement, perceiving it as increasingly powerful 
and anti-Western (Saedi, 2012). At the same time, the U.K. based NGO, Runnymede Trust 
(1997) analyzed in a comprehensive study how Islam was seen and engaged in a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ by Islamophobes (Bonasinga, 2015). 
Moreover, after the rise of ISIS, most South Korean media outlets show a tendency 
that focuses on the brutality of Islamic militants and extremists in the Middle East and 
Europe. This tendency has played a role in rooting the stereotypical images of Islam and 
Muslims. Images are very important because they can take the form of symbols and 
milestones which can constitute the boundary between us and them (O, Lee, 2003). Negative 
images sometimes incite anti-Islam campaigns among conservative groups such as right wing 
politicians and Christians in open places like near the national parliament and government 
complex in 2015 and 2016. The negative framing by the media toward Islam has even led to 
the movement of anti-Halal facilities in South Korea. Under these circumstances, Gang Won 
province and Go Yang City abandoned the plan that establishes Halal food market or Hala 
town because conservative groups and local residents conducted anti-Halal campaigns. Gang 
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Won province even gave up holding the 2017 World Islam Economic Forum despite the 
submission of application form to hold it. This shows that there is an overt antipathy towards 
Halal factories or overt expression of Islam because Halal food symbolizes Islamic religion 
and culture. Regarding this point, South Korean researcher Eom (2015) argues that Muslim 
migrants strongly preserve their religious and cultural identities instead of assimilating into 
original societies in European countries though this is not a South Korean case. Eom (2015) 
also points out that this tendency of Muslim migrants increases concerns and anxieties of 
European majority of people. 
To sum up, the research on images associated with Islam in South Korea shows that 
Islam and Muslims are usually negatively framed and discriminated. Furthermore, mass 
media in South Korea often reports the issue of Islamic militants and extremists in a manner 
that negatively portrays Islam and Muslims. This tendency can lead to negative stereotypical 
expressions and demagogic forces that overwhelm the social discourse regarding 
Islamophobia by dominant groups. These findings help us understand how the framing tactics 
used by the South Korean media are often biased against Muslims and Islam. Thus, this 
tendency of the South Korean media focusing on negative coverage can fuel the spread of 
Islamophobic sentiments by using a type of rhetoric related to prejudice towards Muslims. 
Unfortunately, the research committed by the South Korean government or official 
institutions on images of Islam has not been conclusive while the analysis of visual and 
interviews with Muslims has not been conducted in Korean academia. 
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CHAPTER 6: ONLINE DISCOURSE 
 
The aim of this section is to explore online media platforms most associated with 
Islam and Muslims in South Korea. This section shed light on how online media has become 
a powerful tool for spreading certain images about Islam and Muslims in South Korea. This 
online discourse has been most active in recent years, especially as some specific groups 
including influential Protestant leaders use social media to raise concerns about the spread of 
Islam. They do so primarily by linking Islam with negative matters such as threat of terrorism 
and uncivilized culture. First of all, it will investigate how Islam has been discussed in 
internet websites and social media platforms in the Korean language and how online 
discourse regarding Islam and Muslims has emerged and developed. This section will analyze 
official reports from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea and existing research 
papers comparing South Korea with Western cases. This section will also attempt to find 
common rhetoric by discussing South Korean Twitter content analysis between January and 
July in 2016. The outcome will demonstrate how social media plays a role in contributing to 
an increase in Islamophobic sentiments through reproducing false and negative images or 
hate speech towards Muslims in South Korea.  
 
Online Discourse towards Muslims in South Korea 
In addition to an increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric from the traditional mass media, 
South Korea has been experiencing a rise of Islamophobic sentiments in online media since 
2014. Online abuse is not restricted to online Islamophobia but also includes online incidents 
of racism, homophobic abuse, gender-based abuse and anti-disability abuse (The Huffington 
Post, 2013). Particularly, online anti-Muslim sentiments occurring in recent years on social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook can be categorized as “cyber hate” and 
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“cybercrimes” (Awan, 2014). A recent report conducted by Feldman et al. (2013) regarding 
online anti-Muslim prejudice highlighted the following: “The online domain remains under-
researched and much less attention has been paid to online hate crimes, which can be the 
precursor to more physically threatening offline incidents.” Many of the comments posted 
online through social networking sites have an extremist and incendiary undertone (Feldman 
et al, 2013). 
To understand the influence of online media in spreading images and forming public 
opinion is important in South Korea although it is difficult to compare the influence of 
spreading and forming images between traditional mass media and online media (Keats et al, 
2011). Social media platforms were being used to facilitate and form online hate speech and 
intolerance. For example, this type of online hate speech can intensify following some trigger 
incidents such as the Paris attack and the Brussels terror attacks (Awan & Zempi, 2015). Hall 
(2013) argues that the increase in the use of the Internet as a vehicle for hate, prejudice, and 
hostility is seemingly undeniable in a more causal manner. 
Similarly, the phenomenon of anti-Muslim rhetoric has become more pervasive in 
South Korea after a series of terrorist attacks by ISIS in Europe in 2015 and 2016 (G. Koo, 
2016). According to the recent Korean news reports, some Protestants demonstrated their 
hostility by posting and tweeting hate speech towards Muslims. Many internet users have also 
shown their anti-Muslim sentiments by using social media to spread the negative images of 
Muslims. In this regard, building a negative image of Muslims through social media may 
contribute to the rise of Islamophobic sentiments despite them having lived in South Koreans 
for decades, and having continuously migrated into the country. 
However, very little discussion has been initiated regarding online Islamophobia, and 
specifically, that found on social media. In fact, few studies have analyzed the impact and the 
66 
 
role of the internet in spreading anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim opinions in general (Larsson, 
2007). Although the definition of online or cyber Islamophobia remains limited in scope with 
regard to the online dimension of Islamophobia, it gives an important starting point for 
further discussion in this field. To study the influence of the Internet is also significant since 
it is part and parcel of everyday life in most countries that have internet infrastructure 
(Larsson, 2007). In addition, the Internet is used by journalists for gathering information and 
doing research for other media reporting (Ibid). 
In South Korea, much of the multicultural and Islamophobic discourse has occurred 
via online-media, which offers a space for various producers including mainstream media 
professionals, influential internet users, and resident foreigners in order to express their 
opinions (Joseph Yi, 2015). For example, some internet users have shown their anti-
multiculturalism stance or anti-Muslim sentiments by using various social media platforms to 
spread negative images linking Muslims with the brutality of ISIS. According to the recent 
Korean media, some Protestants demonstrated their hostility by posting and tweeting hate 
speech towards Muslims in their social media platforms. Interestingly, however, anti-Muslim 
posts on internet have not translated into offline hate crimes in South Korea because these 
posts often fail to attract public support of the majority of people due to weak factual grounds 
and fabricated images. Although it is not a South Korean case, Feldman et al. (2013) found 
that 74 % of reported anti-Muslim hate speech occurred online, in comparison to 26 % of 
offline incidents. In this sense, some critics argue that the difficult nature of policing online 
space has led to local police forces failing to protect Muslim communities (Awan, 2014). 
One South Korean researcher, Koo Gi Yeon (2016) argues that the reflection of 
Islam in the South Korean media is contributing to the spread of negative images about Islam 
in the society. Koo (2016) suggests that negative words related to Islam surged on social 
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media outlets such as Twitter and blogs after the emergence of ISIS. According to her 
research, negative words most frequently associated with Islam on social media have 
dramatically increased since 2014. For instance, the word most frequently linked with Islam 
on Twitter and blogs was ‘terror’ in 2015. In this sense, Koo (2016) highlights that the fear, 
phobia, and negative rumors about Islam are being constructed through mainly social media. 
However, except this research there have been no previous studies that have focused on the 
role of social media in spreading Islamophobic opinions in South Korea.  
Meanwhile, the anti-Muslim rhetoric relating words such as terrorism, extremism, 
and uncivilized people to Islam on social media has contributed to further worsening the 
attitude of intolerance towards Muslim refugees and migrants in South Korea. In fact, anti-
Muslim sentiments have pervasively spread through social media outlets including Twitter or 
Facebook during the last two years because Muslim migrants are often perceived as potential 
threats to national security, both in terms of economy and safety, even though the Muslim 
community is very small, only 0.3% of total 50 million populations in South Korea. 
According to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, the number or racial 
discrimination speeches against foreigners reached 210, based on internet information found 
through monitoring blogs, news articles comments, and videos between October 1 and 
October 31 in 2010. The NHRCK argued that there was a tendency to consider specific 
foreign migrants such as Muslims as threats or criminals. The NHRCK also found that there 
were discriminatory and prejudicial expressions on the internet based on differences in skin 
color and religion. In addition, it demonstrated that some Korean people have shown their 
hostility towards Muslims by posting or tweeting negative pictures and hate speech on social 
media platforms and more recently, the influx of foreign migrant Muslims coming into the 
country.  
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The analysis of Twitter between January and June in 2016 clearly shows there is 
some negative rhetoric about Islam and Muslims. Figure 1 shows how Korean Twitter users 
usually view the Islamic world in relation to the three main attacks during the last six months 
of 2016. After examining the top 5 Re-tweets related to Islam and Muslims, it is evident that 
there are some specific expressions used that depicts the Islamic world in a negative manner. 
For instance, the top tweet among the most Re-tweeted was related to the GangNam Korean 
woman killed in 2016, and stated that “the rate of killing women is higher [in South Korea] 
than in Islamic countries and this proves that the Republic of Korea is very seriously 
deformed.” This statement implies that the rate of killing women in Islamic countries is high 
as like South Korea or the rest of the world. The second tweet among the most Re-tweeted 
was written just after the Orlando shooting, praising a tweet from then presidential candidate, 
now-U.S. President Donald Trump, mentioning in the Korean language; “Thank you for the 
congratulations on my evaluation that extreme Islamic terror is right. From the incident, 50 
people were killed”. This statement proposes that Islam is a threat to national security. The 
third tweet among the most Re-tweeted states that, “Korea seems to be a civilized country, 
but do not forget that it is no more so than Islamic countries.” This tweet shows the negative 
perceptions of Islamic world regarding civilization and culture among Korean Tweeter users. 
The fourth tweet is set up in a question and answer format, “Who is going to commit terror 
attacks?” while providing 5 choices including “someone who is connected to Muslims.” This 
statement suggests that all Muslims can be terrorists. This table represents typical 
misperceptions towards Muslims and the Islamic world, which consequently has led to the 
reproduction of anti-Muslim rhetoric in South Korea. 
User Name Tweet Date Number of 
Re-tweet 
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kidogom 
 
“…although the rate of arrests [in South Korea] is high, 
the sexual crime rate in this country is number one and 
the rate of killing women is higher than in Islamic 
countries and this proves that the Republic of Korea is 
very seriously deformed” 
 
 
2016-
05-18 
 
3,165 
 
sideway_s 
 
“during the night, after the random shooting in Orlando, 
which dominated the U.S media, the tweet of Trump is 
“Thank you for the congratulations on my assertion that 
extreme Islam terror is right. From the incident, 50 people 
were killed.”” 
 
 
2016-
06-13 
 
561 
 
hottchaa 
 
Re-tweet “…“Korea seems to be a civilized country, but 
do not forget that it is no more so than Islamic countries. 
If something is unsatisfactory, [Koreans] kill women and 
it is emotionally forgiven.” 
 
 
2016-
05-18 
 
364 
 
histopian 
 
“Who is going to commit terrors among the following? 
Someone who is connected to Muslims, someone who 
usually enjoys violent games, someone who often says “I 
will kill you all,” and…” 
 
 
2016-
02-24 
 
309 
 
_llello 
 
“Park Young Sun [lawmaker of opposition party Min-Ju 
party] is going to do a filibuster against the Anti-Terror 
Act, although she announced the party platform is to 
discriminate sexual minority and Islam in the far-right 
Christian event. Isn’t this self-contradiction?” 
 
 
2016-
02-29 
 
276 
Figure 1. Top 5 Selected Tweets among the Most Re-tweeted Between January and 
June 2016 
 
Currently, hate speech can easily be found on many types of websites and social 
media platforms discussing foreign migration workers such as civil groups for foreign 
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laborers, human rights, internet cafes for anti-multicultural policy, and local groups for anti-
foreign criminals in South Korea (Lee, 2015). In these platforms, a lot of hate speech 
targeting foreign migrant workers can be found. According to the report of the National 
Human Rights Commission of Korea in 2012, some extreme hate speech is reproduced online. 
For example, there are some hate comments towards Muslims that, “the priority is illegal 
migrants and is not Koreans in this country” or “Muslims should be banned from approaching 
the G20 conference room” (Lee, 2015). This shows how foreigners from the Islamic world 
are depicted as threatening, often linking them to terrorism (NHRCK, 2011). In addition, this 
kind of anonymous hate speech on the internet is usually not erased by the managers of the 
internet sites or related organizations due to the lack of criminal regulation. This seems like a 
backlash against Muslim practices despite the fact that violent protests towards them have not 
directly happened in the streets. This is particularly true because anti-Muslim sentiments have 
dramatically increased after the terror attacks by ISIS in Europe, the U.S, and Asia. To some 
extent, it is not strange for social media to have a tendency to focus on conflict issues and 
portray events involving Muslims as religiously motivated. However, the users of social 
media are not likely to take their responsibilities attributing the fault to primary sources of 
information they are citing, although social media sometimes depends on anonymous sources 
and untrustworthy information.  
In general, some social media outlets have shown a tendency to legitimize 
Islamophobic attitudes in the name of ‘freedom of speech’ (Bryfonski, 2012). This tendency 
can potentially lead to hate crimes and hate speech due to the wide spread of anti-Muslim 
prejudice. Moreover, there could be even more attacks towards Muslims on internet because 
the level of hate speech has increasingly strengthened among South Korean social media 
users. In order to prevent online abuse, some Western countries provide an example of how 
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to tackle these phenomenons. For example, the police in the U.K. have an online tool called 
‘True Vision’ that restricts and punish cyber hate crimes including, illegal content that 
threatens or harasses a person or group because they are of a different race, religion, or sexual 
orientation (Awan, 2014). However, South Korea currently has no tools or measures to tackle 
cyber hate crimes. 
In South Korea, social media is a very popular tool to communicate each other. 35 
million South Koreans are using the internet, while most of them use social media via 
computers or mobiles. In particular, Twitter and Facebook have become more influential 
platforms. According to a survey, around 5 million South Koreans were using Twitter in 2011 
while 19 million South Koreans currently have Facebook pages. For this reason, it is 
meaningful to investigate the role of social media, especially focusing on the case study of 
Twitter, in framing anti-Muslim sentiments in South Korea. This thesis conducts an in-depth 
analysis by using Twitter because it can be a starting point in helping detect and tackle online 
Islamophobic attitudes in South Korean society. In South Korea, social media has become a 
communication platform that has played a huge role in developing public opinions. 
 
Case Study of Twitter 
This case study on Twitter uses both quantitative and qualitative data gathering 
techniques to analyze text mining, opinion mining, and the content of hate speech based on 
all comments and posts in Twitter during the research period. By using the electronic 
software system ‘Net Miner,’ which was invented by CYRAM Korean Company, one is able 
to collate ‘high frequency’ words and patterns that are directly related to anti-Muslim hate 
speech. The data from Twitter is obtained from tweets generated between January 1
st
 2016 
and June 30
th
 2016. This period was chosen because a series of terror attacks by Islamic 
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extremists such as ISIS took place in Orlando, the U.S. and Brussels, Belgium during this 
time, motivating increased Islamophobic expression throughout the world. This period is also 
significant since Islamophobic expressions and sentiments were prevalent due to a few major 
terrorist attacks during this time. This research examines 13,082 tweets from 8,556 different 
Twitter users in order to find out how Muslims are viewed in South Korea via Twitter 
platform. It includes all relevant tweets that Twitter users created, Re-tweets, and Reply 
tweets. All of the tweets are available and accessible in the open public domain. An 
overwhelming majority of tweets were written and posted in the Korean language. This 
research uses the terms Muslims AND ISIS, Muslims AND Extremism, Muslims AND 
Terrorist, and Muslims AND Militants. These results provide some characteristics of the 
offenders such as their political and religious leanings, politically right-wing leaning 
tendency, and being fundamental Protestants.  
By using this research method, this section examines not only common terms by 
using big data of Twitter collections on Islam and Muslims but also investigates some 
characteristics of hate speech from the offenders to categorize patterns emerging regarding 
online Islamophobia. This method also allows for an opportunity to use specific terms such as 
extremist and militant, as a means to see how Muslims are depicted in South Korea during a 
specific time frame.  
During the period of this study, there were two main terror attacks in the U.S. and 
Belgium. In the U.S., Omar Mir Mateen, who was Afghani-American, shot and killed 50 and 
injured 53 at a nightclub in Florida on the 12
th
 of June. After the attack, Mateen pledged 
loyalty to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakhr Al Baghdadi, but it was not clear if ISIS was directly 
responsible for the incident. In Belgium, there were three bomb attacks resulting in 34 deaths, 
including two suicide bombers, and over 250 injuries on 22th of March. These two attacks 
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influenced some Asian countries including South Korea, as can be seen through the active 
use of Twitter where Koreans posted fake articles and pictures about Islam and Muslims. 
Interestingly, when a 35-year-old Korean man, who claimed himself to be a “self-woman-
phobe”, randomly stabbed and killed a 23-year old Korean woman without any reason in the 
center of Gang Nam District, Seoul on 17 May, 2016, there was a dramatic increase in tweets 
comparing the incident to the conditions of women in the Islamic world. The exact 
motivation is still unclear, but this incident drew controversy and was referred to as “woman-
phobia” within Korean society. Such phenomenon may result from the ignorance about 
Muslims and Islam. South Korean scholar Cho Hee Sun (1990) points out that this ignorance 
is mainly from the lack of South Koreans’ understanding of the cultural and religious 
difference between Korea and the Islamic world since Koreans have not had a close 
relationship with it. In this sense, this research shows how Islam and Muslims were depicted 
both before and after two key incidents.  
 
Content Analysis 
 
Figure 2. Word Cloud of Frequent Anti-Muslim Posts of Top 20 from Twitter 
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According to the analysis of Twitter’s search engine, there were a number of terms 
that were used to describe Islam and Muslims in a negative manner. Some of the most 
common reappearing words used to describe Islam and Muslims in a derogatory way were 
examined (Figure 2). These include the following: Terror (12.6%), Muslim (8.3%), ISIS 
(6.4%), Extremism (4.5 %), Islamic State (3.8 %), Militant (2.9 %), and Terrorist (2.8 %). 
Figure 3 shows the top 20 ranking which includes both Islam (20.8%) and Muslims (8.3%). 
Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate a trend regarding Islam and Muslims in an overall 
negative manner on Twitter. 
Islam 1,181  20.8% 
 
Terror 716  12.6% 
 
Muslim 470  8.3% 
 
ISIS 365  6.4% 
 
Extremism 253  4.5% 
 
State 236  4.2% 
 
Islamic State 214  3.8% 
 
America 181  3.2% 
 
Islamic State IS 181  3.2% 
 
Militant 165  2.9% 
 
Terrorist 160  2.8% 
 
Extremist 146  2.6% 
 
Extreme 122  2.1% 
 
People 122  2.1% 
 
Korea 105  1.8% 
 
Woman 98  1.7% 
 
News 93  1.6% 
 
Religion 93  1.6% 
 
Europe 90  1.5% 
 
Figure 3. Top 20 Frequently Used Words Related to Islam and Muslims in South 
Korea 
 
Net Miner, which is electronic software system that can collate ‘high frequency’ 
words and patterns, was used to examine the time and the frequency regarding the use of 
terms related to Islam and Muslims. As Figure 4 demonstrates, between the months that the 
attacks in Orlando and Brussels happened from March to June 2016, the overall number of 
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tweets with anti-Muslim rhetoric dramatically increased from 2,062 to 3,118, with a peak of 
4,201 near the end of the period. This echoed the feelings on Islam or Muslims among South 
Korean Twitter users. In particular, one day after the Orlando attack, there were 1,638 tweets 
among 10,120 total tweets. This shows a dramatic increase of tweets, which mainly associate 
terror attacks with the terms ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslims’. Similarly, both the day of and one day 
after the Brussels bomb attacks, there were 92 and 127 tweets per day respectively. 
Additionally, the killing of the Korean woman in Seoul mentioned above led to explosive 
responses on Twitter throughout South Korea. The tweets associated with Islam on the day of 
the incident reached 2,875 out of a total 10,120: the largest number in six months. This data 
demonstrates there is a clear relationship between terror attacks and the spread of negative 
images regarding Islam and Muslims. 
In some cases, Twitter users simply used Twitter as a tool to antagonize and create 
hostility with Re-tweets and Reply tweets. For example, Christian Liberal Party is running an 
official Twitter account and its members often reveal their hostilities towards Muslims by 
using Re-tweets and Reply tweets of anti-Muslims speech and negative images on them. 
Moreover, some tweets used a negative hashtag to spread campaigns such as against the 
building of a Halal factory in South Korea using a big picture containing ISIS militant 
members or ISIS flag. These results demonstrate negative incidents related to Muslims or 
phobias against specific groups have contributed to the Islamophobic attitudes on Twitter. 
The figure in these graphs reveals how hate speech against Muslims is being deep-rooted in 
South Korea. Thus, the figure may be an example of the rise of Islamophobic attitudes in 
South Korea. 
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 Figure 4. Graph on Twitter Buzz between January and June in 2016 
 
Additionally, most of the top 20 frequent tweets emerging with two words together 
related to Islam or Muslims showed a strong Islamophobic tone and blamed Muslims on 
particular issues in order to justify their abuse (Figure 5). Some accounts were open about 
their anger and hatred for Muslims and Islam as a result of the two attacks in the U.S. and 
Belgium. For example, the same day and one day after the two attacks anti-Islam expressions 
linking Muslims with Terror or ISIS surged dramatically on Twitter. In addition, a number of 
accounts used anti-Islam images and literature as a means to defame Muslims as dangerous 
pedophiles (Figure 6. 76p). Some internet users spread wrong Islamic basics of Quran on 
Twitter. For example, a user claimed that, “it is possible to rape, marry, and divorce with girls 
who have not started puberty –Quran 65:4” without any factual grounds. This tendency 
shows that some Twitter users consider Muslims a dangerous group or a threat to South 
Korean society. Consequently, this tendency can worsen the image of Islam and Muslims 
because it provides South Koreans with a negative perception of Islam and Muslims on the 
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internet. These tweets are also a significant factor since some specific words frequently used 
in social media can represent the overall image about Islam in South Korea. 
word1 word2 frequency 
Islam Terror 380  
Terror Muslim 223  
Islam State 202  
Islam Extremism 185  
Islam ISIS 182  
Terror ISIS 134  
Islam Extremist 132  
Islam Militant 112  
Islam America 104  
ISIS Extremism 93  
Muslim Terror 91  
Islam Muslim 88  
Extremism Militant 81  
Islam Extreme 78  
Terror America 77  
Terror Extremism 69  
ISIS Islamic State 68  
ISIS Militant 63  
Islam Religion 59 
Islam Belgium 59  
Figure 5. The Top 20 Key Words Regarding Islam and Muslim with Number 
Frequency Emerging Together 
  
In addition to these tweets, there were some trending words and images across 
Twitter where Muslims were being depicted through photos as extremists and terrorists, 
linked to online news sites and websites. Some of them often equate Muslims with terrorism, 
lawlessness, or killers who want to kill non-Muslims. Members of an anti-Islam group posted 
a picture where they were protesting against influx of Islamic funds and Muslims in South 
Korea (Figure 7). This idea often targets the Islamic culture or Halal food of Muslims and 
Islamic law. Even a Twitter user, who urged the passage of the anti-terror Act in parliament, 
posted a brutal picture of a beheading by ISIS (Figure 8). The aim of these tweets and 
pictures seem to not only be the spread of hateful content, but also a normalizing of this 
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content. Some staffs from Christian Liberal Party posted their photos of election campaigns 
in the streets while pledging to stop Islam, homosexuality, and anti-Christianity laws. In 
addition, some South Korean internet users have a tendency to upload or linked brutal and 
sensational video and photos while spreading false information about Islam (Figure 8; Figure 
9; Figure 10).  
Although some hate comments and pictures posted on Twitter are not directly related 
to the three main attacks, Brussels’ attack, GangNam killing, Orlando shooting, they can play 
a role in spreading negative images that Muslims are a potential threat or dangerous people 
who conduct or involve terrorist attacks. Consequently, these Re-tweets formed and 
promoted Islamophobic discourse in South Korea contributing to constructing a typology.  
 
Figure 6. A Korean Twitter User Claimed “Muslim Holy Book Quran Is Teaching 
Violation of Human Rights, Persecution, Massacre, and Terror. We Must Stop the Hala Food 
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Factory in Ik-San. It is Horrifying.” The black box below states that, “The 13 Doctrine that 
the Quran Teaches: 1. It is possible to rape, marry, and divorce with girls who have not 
started puberty – Quran 65:4 2. It is possible to possess other people as sex slaves and labor 
slaves – Quran 4:3, 4:24, 5:89, 33:50, 58:3, 70:30…7. If you kill non-Muslims, you will be 
awarded with 72 virgins in heaven – Quran 9:11. 8. Kill the people who leave Islam - Quran 
2:217, 4:89.” [17-Jan-2016] 
 
 
Figure 7. A Campaign against Islamic Fund and the Influx of Muslims into South 
Korea. The slogans states, “Random killing terror in France is not other country’s matter” 
“Let’s protect our country from Muslim ISIS terror” “Against Islam Money” “Against Halal 
food”. [07-Jan-2016] 
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Figure 8. In a South Korean street, a woman staff from Christian Liberal Party raises 
poster which contains, “Christian Liberal Party will definitely stop homosexuality, Islam, and 
anti-Christianity laws”. Right picture is the official parliament election poster of the party. 
[06-April-2016], [04-April-2016] 
 
 
Figure 9. A Video Capture Linked with a South Korean Twitter. This Placard states 
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that, “The Government Should Stop the Plan of Islam Halal Food that it is pushing ahead 
because Halal Food Can Danger the Republic of Korea due to the Islamization”. This Protest 
Was Held in Ik-San City Where Was Expected to Held Hala Food Factory. [03-Feb-2016] 
 
Figure 10. A South Korean Twitter User links a YouTube video which shows anti-
Islam campaign in the street. The campaigners raise posters related to ISIS and Al-Qaeda 
attacks claiming that, “Europe awfully regrets in accepting Muslims” “Terrorists can come to 
Korea with Halal food”. [14-Jan-2016] 
 
 
From these findings, it may be clear that some Twitter users in South Korea had 
similar motivations. They seem to be seeking online hegemony as shown by some tweets 
from Twitter accounts to collect and maximize influence. In this sense, this research sheds 
light on the potential of Twitter affording some people the motivation to commit online 
trolling, consequently, seeking to target specific people (Iganski, 2012).  
Regarding this point, Awan (2014) categorizes the following content behavioral 
offender typologies: the trawler (a person who has gone through other people’s Twitter 
accounts; the apprentice (someone who is fairly new to Twitter but nonetheless has begun to 
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target people with the help of more experienced online abusers); the disseminator (someone 
who has tweeted about and re-tweeted messages, pictures, and documents of online hate; the 
impersonator (a person who is using a fake profile, account, and images to target individuals); 
the accessory (a person who is joining in with other people’s conversations via Twitter to 
target vulnerable people); the reactive (a person who follows a major incident or issue on 
immigration, will begin an online campaign targeting that specific group and individual); the 
mover (someone who regularly changes their Twitter account in order to continue targeting 
someone from a different profile); and lastly, the professional (a person who has a huge 
following on Twitter and regardless of consequences has and will launch a major campaign 
of hate against an individual or group of people) (Awan, 2015). Although there are typologies 
of offenders, it may be difficult to identify these main typologies within the South Korean 
case study because it does not provide any information regarding the users of Twitter in 
South Korea. For this reason, this case study cannot specify who the main actors are and who 
tweet or write against Islam and Muslims  
By focusing on Twitter case of South Korea, this study gives us a better 
understanding of how social media reflects the ideas of Islamophobic sentiments in South 
Korea among certain sections. The tweets examined in this thesis also highlight the 
derogatory and systematic abuse that people suffer as a result of online abuse. In this way, 
this case study shows that there is a need for improved dialogue between different 
stakeholders and social media networks to ensure that online anti-Muslim incidents of hate 
are taken seriously. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis analyzed the roots of Islamophobic discourse within a relatively mono-
ethnic South Korean society by using the securitization lens. A number of conclusions are 
drawn from the main factors influencing the spread of Islamophobic sentiments in South 
Korea. The South Korean case illustrates the extent to which a combination of political, 
social, and religious factors plays in with securitization process. Also, negative images of 
Islam and Muslims on social media including Twitter are deep rooted in the country, 
consequently, these images have laid the groundwork for the Islamophobic discourse. In this 
way, the outcomes of this thesis show how Muslim migrants are being viewed and dealt with 
in South Korean society while demonstrating the relationship between the Muslim minority 
and the secular Korean majority. However, the main cause of Islamophoic sentiments in the 
country seems to be the excessive security threat related to Islam and Muslim issues. 
First of all, the security factors which have been shown to be paramount in South 
Korean politics are: the assessment and roles of right wing politicians, intelligence authority, 
and conservative civil and religious groups regarding Islamic issues and Muslim migrants 
living in South Korea. These crucial elements should be mentioned at first because they can 
heavily influence substantial government policies and relevant laws regarding Muslim 
community in the country. In fact, there is a lack of legislation of hate crimes in protecting 
minority groups including Muslim migrant community in secular Korean society. Under this 
circumstance, these ruling and religious groups could utilize ISIS issues in order to obtain 
political benefits and strengthen their discourse while ignoring legal protection issues. On the 
other hand, legalization of the Anti-Terrorism Act in South Korea shows the government’s 
increasing concerns against the potential threat of Islamic extremists and illegal Muslim 
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migrants. The political and securitized environment in the country seems to cope with social 
backlash against Islam issues. This is because the phenomenon appears when a threat is 
defined as a situation in which securitizing groups have an intention to inflict a negative 
consequence on the Muslim minority. Additionally, from this research it was found that 
security discourse has played a main role in spreading both the perception of risk and a sense 
of safety when discussing security threats in the country. Since 2014, a series of terror attacks 
allowed the South Korean ruling party to lead security discourse and succeed in passing the 
Anti-Terrorism Act by using securitization of threat. As a result of this heightening the 
security discourse and the growing threat from ISIS, Act that authorizes the NIS to have more 
power such as monitoring any suspicious groups and collecting information for anti-terrorism 
missions was passed in the parliament in 2016. In this way, if security discourse is 
instrumentalized by political rhetoric, it may induce negative perception and the development 
of Islamophobic sentiments. Accordingly, the numerically negligible Muslim minority in 
South Korea might experience growing public hostility; consequently, it may result in raising 
emotional mobilization of South Korean citizens against Islam without them actually 
knowing enough about Islam and Muslims. Additionally, it is revealed that while there are no 
legal protection systems that can prosecute hate speech and hate crimes against foreign 
migrants including Muslim workers while the government policy toward foreign Muslim 
migrants has not changed with regards to controlling them systemically. Thus, Muslim 
migrants living in South Korea have had to cope with issues of unprotected human and labor 
rights. Under these circumstances, political decision makers securitized ISIS issues by 
portraying Muslims as a threat while they resist addressing possible growing Islamophobic 
sentiments in an increasingly securitized environment.  
The second social factors which have been shown to be paramount in contributing to 
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Islamophobic discourse include the ideological perception of a relatively mono-ethnic 
country regarding foreigners, and an environment that pushes for assimilation, which has 
been further reinforced by deep-rooted anti-multiculturalism sentiments since 2004. This 
social discourse is embedded in different contexts. Some detractors of the multiculturalism 
campaign claimed that foreign Muslim migrants, building mosques, Halal factories, and 
Islamic finance funds should be banned based on the assumption of a mono-ethnic ideology 
among South Koreans. In particularly, Halal food industries in South Korea have been 
blamed by various conservative groups who have prejudice and misperceptions regarding 
Islam. Although radical campaigns such as banning entry of all Muslim have found little in 
South Korea, a few specific issues such as Halal food industry has been often targeted by 
some conservative Koreans because Halal food maybe more feasible component of religion 
in the street. Also, the main Islamic practice among Muslims such as five times praying is not 
freely allowed when they want to pray in many South Korean workplaces. Others even try to 
legalize their Islamophobic positions by referring to conspiracies of an alleged “Islamization 
of South Korea” or “Occupation of Muslim populations in South Korea” linking the higher 
threat of terrorism to the current influx of Muslim migrants and refugee crisis. These 
examples clearly reveal the intolerance of South Korean society towards Islam and Muslim 
culture based on the ideology of the mono-ethnic society that might be linked to Orientalism 
developed by the West. In the end, these factors contribute to fuel the rise of Islamophobic 
discourse throughout the society, justifying hostile attitudes by portraying foreign Muslims as 
potential security threats. Moreover, anti-multicultural discourse to some extent influenced 
the formation of anti-Muslim sentiments by increasing anxiety under the environment of 
growing public debate about illegal foreign workers including Muslim migrants. In this way, 
this section implies how social discourse of victimhood regarding the Muslim minority is 
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associated with homogeneous dominant groups in South Korea.  
The third religious factors contributing to Islamophobic discourse in South Korea 
include the role of Protestants and pervasive misperceptions about Islam and Muslims in 
Korean churches. Particularly, the tensions between Protestantism and Islam have emerged as 
some Protestants have repeatedly produced negative stereotypes against Islam and Muslims. 
This study shows that Protestants have played a crucial role in securitizing ISIS in the same 
manner as conservative politicians. Due to the lobbies of Protestants, laws related to hate 
crimes have not come to exist in South Korea. By doing so, some Protestants seem to believe 
that they are playing a role in preserving South Korean identity such as mono-ethnic nation or 
genuine descent in the country. In this sense, they have maintained their religious dominant 
positions in the country and have tried to spread common rhetoric and misperceptions about 
Islam without factually-based arguments. At the same time, they often reveal their tendency 
to create a dichotomy between “us” and “them”. Consequently, they attempt to rationalize the 
discrimination and hostile feelings towards Muslims in order to maintain a dominant position 
in religious demographics. Their strategies of blaming Muslim migrants and attributing their 
own problems to others seem to be an attempt to escape of their problems from a decrease in 
believers and criticism from some civil society due to the discriminate and fundamental 
ideology regarding religions. 
The South Korean media is another component that has contributed to the deep-
rooted stereotypes about Islam and Muslims in the country. In fact, this tendency of focusing 
on conflict issues related to Islam and Muslims has laid the groundwork for fueling 
Islamophobic attitudes in South Korea for decades. Particularly, anti-Muslim rhetoric from 
the media has influenced the spread of negative images of Islam and Muslims in South 
Korean society. After a series of terror attacks by ISIS throughout the world, some social 
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groups and the media have securitized issues related to Islam and refugee issues while 
simultaneously showing a tendency to condone Islamophobic attitudes. 
Lastly, the online factors which have been shown to be dominant in Islamophobic 
discourse are the growing influence of social media and its use by conservative groups in 
South Korea. Some conservative Protestants have actively used social media not only as a 
tool to expand Islamophobic discourse, but also in simultaneously spreading hate speech and 
negative images regarding Islam and Muslims to defame them. While social media including 
Twitter has popularity in South Korea, it has recently become a main platform of 
conservative groups for spreading negative images. This study has also revealed that social 
media users often depict incidents involving Muslims as religiously motivated. Furthermore, 
from the case study on Twitter in South Korea, it is evident that anti-Muslim hate speech and 
images are distributed in a negative manner. By analyzing frequent negative rhetoric and hate 
speech towards Muslims, the study clearly shows that the role of social media including 
Twitter has aggravated the Islamophobic discourse. 
Overall, this thesis argues that a narrow security agenda, lack of legal protection and 
engagement with Muslim community, and a spread of negative stereotypes against Muslims 
especially in conservative groups can fuel more Islamophobic attitudes. Through these factors, 
Muslim migrants have been marginalized and demonized in South Korea. This represents an 
aspect of vulnerability of Muslim migrants within society that may also threaten social 
cohesion in the country because many innocent and law-abiding Muslims could be the 
victims of hate crimes committed due to growing Islamophobia. In fact, the public 
Islamophobic discourse in South Korea seems to be successful in spreading the alleged 
Islamic threat into existence. At the same time, the government’s multicultural policy in 
South Korea is facing the challenge of a racially homogeneous ideology which can lead to 
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discriminatory speech and acts against foreigners including Muslims. This circumstance may 
undermine the multiculturalism policy, which the South Korean government has to pursue 
near future.  
The conclusions in this research are also applied to hypothesizing about the trend of 
attitudes of South Koreans toward Islam and Muslims by analyzing social media, particularly 
Twitter. Furthermore, this thesis helps us to understand the securitization process in South 
Korea by focusing on the role of the securitizing actors that spread Islamic threats into 
existence. From the South Korean case, the securitization theory can provide us the frame of 
the understanding the background of the rise of Islamophobic sentiments despite the small 
number of Muslims in the country. In practice, in the South Korean case, these have tended to 
galvanize the spread of Islamophobic discourse, especially after the Paris attacks and the rise 
of ISIS. In this sense, a case study on South Korea provides insight into understanding the 
factors that fuel Islamophobic discourse in South Korea. 
However, due to the nature of this discursive analysis, its findings cannot be 
generalized to all South Koreans and their sentiments about Islam and Muslim migrants. 
Moreover, there are limitations in the scope of analysis in this field as well as the research 
period, which made collecting data difficult in some cases, specifically when discussing 
abstract concepts such as positive meaning or negative meaning. In addition, it is not clear 
whether social media users including Twitter users frankly expressed their opinions about 
Muslim migrants. Additionally, the contents of online media remain limited in scope in 
regard to the area of Islamophobia. 
In this regard, this research did not cover all aspects of Islam and Muslims in South 
Korea. It focused mainly on the contentious discourse surrounding ISIS and Muslim minority. 
For this reason, further investigation is needed in order to understand the complex nature and 
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interrelated challenges that Muslim migrants face in South Korea. For instance, the positive 
influence of Islamic culture can be an example to help in understanding the dynamics of 
different religions within a multi-cultural society.  
Despite this limitation, this overall research may be meaningful because it reveals 
many implications for the South Korean society. First of all, it is recommended that the South 
Korean government and policy makers should make and pass legislation such as hate speech 
and hate crime prevention laws towards Muslim migrants on the basis of human rights 
towards minority groups. Under the new government, there are more prospects for the 
introduction of new hate crime legislation in the country, but politicians in the parliament 
need to put more efforts in making relevant laws to prevent the spread of Islamophobic 
attitudes. This movement will help South Korean society facilitate the integration of foreign 
migrants and to protect their basic rights. Moreover, South Korean politicians must not 
misuse security discourse to obtain their interests or benefits. Prior to prevent hate crimes and 
hate speech towards Muslim migrants in the streets or on internet, it is essential to be aware 
the fact that multicultural society requires more understanding of different cultures and 
religions. As a host society, South Korea will need to become more open towards Islamic 
practices to respect a religious minority for social integration. Since South Korea is going 
down the road of pluralism, it is important to forestall the cultural clashes that have rocked 
other societies.  
One of the main problems to solve it is that South Korea as a whole does not seem to 
be ready to deal with Islamophobia. Additionally, it is not rational to condemn or diabolize an 
entire Muslim group of people or religious community for the brutal acts of a small numbers 
due to the propagated purposes in different religion and culture. This is because the blind 
condemnation can hurt all those who practice Islam peacefully and who reject the abuse of 
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Islam as a tool of violence. In addition to this, unfortunately, the pervasive anti-Muslim hate 
speech on social media in South Korea is an indicator of the prevalence of Islamophobic 
discourses in the country in general. In this sense, it is necessary to state that many of the 
right-wing politicians and Protestants who are mainly spreading Islamophobic feelings are 
not being dealt with by social norms and systems. 
Consequently, the findings of this thesis suggest that the South Korean society is far 
from demonstrating tolerance towards Islam and Muslims and tackling stereotypes and 
prejudices against them. These attitudes can potentially incite actual hate crimes if adequate 
preventions are not put in place in South Korea. In order to solve this problem, as previously 
mentioned, implementing same legal and civil rights that protect South Koreans, including 
social services, equitable treatment, and freedom from harassment, and medical services can 
reduce the gap between the dominant groups and the Muslim minority in South Korea. 
Furthermore, both formal and informal educational efforts should be placed into promoting 
harmony between native South Koreans and foreign Muslims. It is also very important for 
South Korean churches, especially, Protestants to attempt to understand what Islam is and 
who Muslims are based on a partnership that can bridge the gap between Christians and 
Muslims through friendly overtures. At the same time, the mass media and social media 
should play a role in encouraging to report and spread more neutral and positive aspects of 
Islamic issues and other migrant Muslims to foster harmony amongst diverse ethnic groups in 
South Korea. Lastly, it is crucial that Muslims living in South Korea develop strategies to 
cope with difficulties such as discrimination and misperceptions. For instance, some previous 
studies suggested that the Muslim community needed to establish a unified front based on a 
firm religious bond to counter discrimination and prejudice. In this sense, one of the most 
important elements between the Muslim minority and non-Muslim secular dominant group 
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should be tolerance and friendship. 
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